[ G.R. No. 271701. May 06, 2025 ] EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 271701. May 06, 2025 ]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. NIPPON EXPRESS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
ZALAMEDA, J.:
In the instant case, We clarify which court exercises jurisdiction over certiorari petitions against interlocutory orders or judgments of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in Division. Specifically, the Court underlines that the CTA En Banc has no certiorari power over the interlocutory issuances of its Division. Instead, petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders or judgments of the CTA Divisions are cognizable by the Supreme Court.
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the CTA En Banc.
Antecedents
The case stemmed from a Petition for Review on Certiorari[4] filed by respondent Nippon Express Philippines Corporation (Nippon Express) with the CTA Second Division on January 15, 2021, docketed as CTA Case No. 10450. Nippon Express sought the refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC) in the amount of PHP 43,068,252.54, allegedly representing its unutilized input value-added tax (VAT) attributable to zero-rated sales made during the period covering April 1, 2018 to June 30, 2018.[5] The CIR filed several extensions for time to file an answer. On May 6, 2021, the CIR electronically filed and served its Answer[6] to the Petition.[7]
On July 21, 2021, the CTA Division issued a Resolution,[8] to wit:
Considering the Report of the Records Division that as of date [CIR] has not filed the hard copy of his Answer to the Petition for Review. Let this case be set for the ex-parte presentation of [Nippon Express]’s evidence on September 8, 2021, at 9:00 a.m.
SO ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis in the original)
The CIR moved for reconsideration, stating that it was a mere oversight that the former handling lawyer (who was already reassigned to another division of the bureau) failed to provide the CTA with a hard copy of the Answer within the extended period allowed therefor, as required in CTA En Banc Resolution No. 4-2021.[10] Having already filed the said hard copy of the Answer on October 4, 2021, CIR urged the relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice by filing a Motion for Reconsideration.[11]
In its Resolution[12] dated November 17, 2021, the CTA Division denied the CIR’s Motion for Reconsideration, ruling that the former counsel’s negligence was inexcusable. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [CIR]’s “Motion for Reconsideration Re: Resolution dated [July 21, 2021]” filed on [October 25, 2021] is hereby DENIED.
Accordingly, the hearing set on [November 24, 2021] at 9:00 [a.m.] via videoconference stands, for the presentation of [Nippon Express]’s evidence ex parte.
SO ORDERED.[13] (Emphasis in the original)
Aggrieved, the CIR elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc, docketed as CTA EB No. 2580, via a Petition for Certiorari[14] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the CTA Division. The CIR averred that Nippon Express should not be allowed to present its evidence ex parte.[15]
Decision of the CTA En Banc
On August 29, 2023, the CTA En Banc issued the assailed Decision, dismissing the CIR’s Petition for lack of jurisdiction. The CTA En Banc determined that it was without jurisdiction over the questioned Resolutions of the CTA Division dated July 21, 2021 and November 17, 2021, as these were interlocutory in nature. The dismissal, however, resulted from the lack of a majority vote in favor of the petition, thus:
In the deliberation of CTA EB No. 2580, Associate Justices Marian Ivy F. Reyes-Fajardo, Jean Marie A. Bacorro Villena, Lanee S. Cui-David, and Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores voted to dismiss said case, because the CTA En Banc lacks jurisdiction over a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, challenging an interlocutory order of the CTA in Division. On the other hand, Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario wrote a Dissenting Opinion. Joining in said Dissenting Opinion are Associate Justices Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban, Catherine T. Manahan, and Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro. Considering that the majority vote was not obtained, the Petition for Certiorari, posted on February 2, 2022, by [CIR] is dismissed, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, posted on February 2, 2022, by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in CTA EB No. 2580, is DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals.
SO ORDERED.[16] (Emphasis in the original)
The CIR filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[17] arguing that the CTA En Banc possesses jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to assail interlocutory orders issued by a CTA Division.
In the now assailed Resolution dated January 26, 2024, the CTA En Banc denied the CIR’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit, stating that, as held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals (First Division)[18] the proper remedy to challenge interlocutory orders of a CTA Division is a petition for certiorari filed directly before this Court, not the CTA En Banc.[19]
Hence, the present Petition.
Issue
The issue to be resolved is whether the CTA En Banc gravely erred in dismissing the CIR’s Petition for Certiorari on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the same.[20]
The CIR insists that the CTA En Banc has jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of the CTA Division through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Adopting the position of CTA Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario in his Dissenting Opinion in CTA EB No. 2580, the CIR argues that the CTA En Banc inherently possesses the authority to issue a writ of certiorari, when necessary, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.[21]
According to the CIR, if the CTA En Banc’s dismissal of certiorari petitions for lack of jurisdiction is upheld, aggrieved parties would be left with no option but to elevate such petitions directly to the Supreme Court. Petitioner points out that, as held in People v. Court of Tax Appeals-Third Division,[22] this Court would also be constrained to dismiss them on the ground that no prior petition had been filed before the CTA En Banc, pursuant to the principle of hierarchy of courts.[23]
The CIR also asserts that requiring the parties to file an appeal before the CTA En Banc to question the decision or resolution of a CTA Division, while simultaneously filing a petition for certiorari before this Court to challenge an interlocutory order issued in the same case, would result in a split-jurisdiction scenario. In such a situation, both the CTA En Banc and this Court would be exercising jurisdiction over the same subject matter—an outcome that undermines the orderly administration of justice.[24]
In contrast, Nippon Express contends that the proper remedy against an interlocutory order issued by a CTA Division is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed directly before this Court—not with the CTA En Banc. According to Nippon Express, the CTA’s certiorari power over interlocutory orders is limited to those issued by the lower courts, and CTA Divisions are not lower courts in relation to the CTA En Banc.[25]
Nippon Express also echoes the view of CTA Associate Jean Marie A. Bacorro-Villena (Justice Bacorro-Villena) that the proper interpretation of the ruling in Court of Tax Appeals-Third Division should be that the CTA En Banc’s jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is limited to those involving a judgment or final order of a CTA Division that cannot be the subject of an appeal before the CTA En Banc such as a judgment of acquittal. By way of exception, the judgment of acquittal may still be reviewed by the CTA En Banc via special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.[26]
Ruling of the Court
Preliminarily, We note that the case is already moot, considering the developments on the main case and the subject matter of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. The records of the CTA would show that the CTA Division promulgated a Decision on September 28, 2023, denying respondent’s Petition for lack of merit, and a Resolution on January 29, 2024 which denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration on the main case.[27]
A case becomes moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by supervening events so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such an instance, there is no actual substantial relief to which a petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Accordingly, courts generally decline jurisdiction over such a case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness since the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.[28]
Unarguably, there is no more justiciable controversy on the propriety of allowing the presentation of respondent’s evidence ex parte since the CTA Division already decided on the main case.
Nevertheless, this Court finds it imperative to resolve the issue of which court has jurisdiction over certiorari petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against interlocutory orders or judgment of the CTA Division.
Indeed, this Court may still decide a case, which is otherwise moot and academic:
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[29] (Emphasis in the original)
Guided by the foregoing, We underscore that the Court may decide the instant case as it is capable of repetition yet evading review, and to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public.
Thus, the remaining issue for resolution is whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, challenging an interlocutory order of a CTA Division, falls under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the CTA En Banc. In other words, does the CTA En Banc possess the power to take cognizance of a petition for certiorari assailing such an interlocutory order?
Upon a careful deliberation, this Court responds to the issue in the negative.
The reasons are set forth below, in seriatim.
The CTA En Banc’s jurisdiction is strictly appellate, besides, the exercise of certiorari presupposes a relationship of superiority
There is no question that the Resolutions dated July 21, 2021 and November 17, 2021 of the CTA Division are interlocutory orders since they did not finally dispose of the case on the merits.[30] The CTA Division merely declared the petitioner in default for its failure to file a hard copy of the Answer to the petition filed by respondent and allowed respondent to present its evidence ex parte.
In this regard, jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case.[31] It is never presumed but is conferred by law and the Constitution.[32] Moreover, it is the Congress which is empowered to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.[33]
Concomitantly, Republic Act No. 1125,[34] as amended by Republic Act No. 9282[35] and Republic Act No. 9503,[36] establishes the CTA and defines its jurisdiction. Section 7 thereof states:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The CTA shall exercise:
a.
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;
Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;
Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and counterbailing duties under Section[s] 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.
b.
Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:
Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than [PHP 1 million] or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action will be recognized.
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
a.
Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions[,] or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, m their respected territorial jurisdiction.
b.
Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions[,] or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts[,] and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c.
Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provided, however, That collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than [PHP 1 million] shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court[,] and Regional Trial Court.
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
a.
Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b.
Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions[,] or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts[,] and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.
Further to this, Rule 4, Section 2 of A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, otherwise known as the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA) summarizes the jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc as follows:
SECTION 2. Cases Within the Jurisdiction of the Court En Banc. — The Court en banc shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following:
(a)
Decisions or resolutions on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Divisions in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over:
(1)
Cases arising from administrative agencies — Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, Department of Finance, Department of Trade and Industry, Department of Agriculture;
(2)
Local tax cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction; and
(3)
Tax collection cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties, where the principal amount of taxes and penalties claimed is less than [PHP 1 million];
(b)
Decisions, resolutions[,] or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction;
(c)
Decisions, resolutions[,] or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction;
(d)
Decisions, resolutions[,] or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of’ the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over tax collection cases;
(e)
Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA) in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;
(f)
Decisions, resolutions[,] or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or the Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs;
(g)
Decisions, resolutions[,] or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in Division in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned in the preceding subparagraph; and
(h)
Decisions, resolutions[,] or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over criminal offenses mentioned in subparagraph (f). (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Rule 2, Section 2 of the RRCTA provides for the CTA En Banc’ s original jurisdiction:
SECTION 2. Exercise of Powers and Functions. — The Court shall exercise its adjudicative powers, functions and duties en banc or in Divisions.
The Court shall sit en banc in the exercise of its administrative, ceremonial and non-adjudicative functions.
Based on the foregoing, the CTA En Banc exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered. by the CTA Division, whether in the exercise of their original and appellate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal actions.
Indeed, the law creating the CTA does not expressly grant the CTA En Banc original certiorari jurisdiction over interlocutory orders issued by a CTA Division. The RRCTA, which essentially mirrors the statutory framework, is likewise silent on whether the CTA En Banc exercises original certiorari jurisdiction over such interlocutory orders.
As pointed out by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa) in the deliberations of herein case, the CTA En Banc exercises only appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CTA Division as explicitly provided under Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282,[37] which reads:
Section 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. — No civil proceeding involving matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local Government Code shall be maintained, except as herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc. (Emphasis in the original)
So too, as observed by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao (Justice Dimaampao), the CTA in Division exercises both original and appellate jurisdiction over administrative bodies and the courts of first instance involving tax matters. In contrast, the CTA En Banc exercises only appellate jurisdiction over decisions or rulings of the CTA in Division, those of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, and cases that originated from the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts. The appellate jurisdiction exercised by the CTA En Banc over the CTA in Division is not plenary or unlimited, but is constrained to final dispositions.[38]
Accordingly, the very wording of the law reinforces the interpretation that the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc is intended to be narrower in scope than that of the CTA in Division.
On this note, the writ of certiorari traces its roots to the English common law. Originally, it was a prerogative writ issued by superior courts (such as the King’s Bench or Chancery) to command inferior courts or public authorities to transmit the record of proceedings for review. Its purpose was to ensure that lower courts did not exceed their jurisdiction or act contrary to law, and to provide a remedy when no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy was available. The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged this historical context:
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King’s Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court’s judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.[39]
As such, the exercise of certiorari presupposes a relationship of superiority—an act whereby a higher tribunal corrects the errors of a subordinate body. Absent such hierarchy, the very premise of certiorari falls away, for without inferiority, there can be no supervisory correction.
Being a collegial body, no hierarchy exists between the CTA En Banc and its Divisions
Jurisprudence establishes that certiorari, as adopted in the Philippines, is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court of record; or other tribunal or officer, exercising a judicial function, requiring the certification and return to the former of some proceeding then pending, or the record and proceedings in some cause already terminated, in cases where the procedure is not according to the course of the common law.[40] The remedy is brought against a lower court, board, or officer rendering a judgment or order and seeks the annulment or modification of the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and the granting of such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. It is available when the following elements concur:
That it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; That such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and That there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[41]
Certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rules laid down by law. The extraordinary writ of certiorari may be availed of only upon a showing, in the minimum, that respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
From the foregoing, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the court granting the writ must be superior to the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ is directed. This requirement is gravely wanting in the case of the CTA En Banc and the CTA Division.
For one, Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282 and Republic Act No. 9503, the law creating the CTA, only contemplates one agency or judicial entity, the CTA itself:
SEC. 2. Sitting En Banc or Division; Quorum; Proceedings. — The CTA may sit en banc or in [three] Divisions, each Division consisting of [three] Justices.
[Five] Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions en banc and [two] Justices for sessions of a Division. Provided, That when the required quorum cannot be constituted due to any vacancy, disqualification, inhibition, disability, or any other lawful cause, the Presiding Justice shall designate any Justice of other Divisions of the Court to sit temporarily therein.
The affirmative votes of [five] members of the Court en banc shall be necessary to reverse a decision of a Division but a simple majority of the Justices present necessary to promulgate a resolution or decision in all other cases or [two] members of a Division, as the case may be, shall be necessary for the rendition of a decision or resolution in the Division Level. (Emphasis supplied.)
The CTA is a special court of the same level as the Court of Appeals (CA), possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice,[42] with functions of a trial court,[43] much like the Sandiganbayan. Simply put, it is a collegial court; the CTA Divisions and the CTA En Banc constitute one and the same body, differentiated only by procedural composition. What sets it apart from the CA and the Sandiganbayan, however, is that it is the only collegial court that sits en banc to review decisions or resolutions (on motions for reconsideration or new trial) of its own divisions.
As discussed in Payumo v. Hon. Sandiganbayan:[44]
Collegial is defined as relating to a collegium or group of colleagues. In turn, the Latin collegium is ‘an executive body with each member having approximately equal power and authority.’ The members of the tax court act on the basis of consensus or majority rule. The three Justices of a Division, rather than a single judge, are naturally expected to exert keener judiciousness and to apply broader circumspection in trying and deciding cases.[45]
As a collegial body, the CTA exercises judicial power through a collective decision-making process by multiple members acting as one entity. Thus, the CTA’s authority is not vested in any individual member, nor is it divided into distinct levels between the CTA En Banc, on the one hand, and the CTA Division, on the other.
It is worth noting that Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282 and Republic Act No. 9503, explicitly states that the CTA shall function either En Banc or in Divisions, with no indication that either form is inherently superior to the other. The CTA En Banc and the CTA Division are merely configurations of the same judicial entity, exercising jurisdiction over tax cases as conferred by law. The CTA En Banc is not a separate tribunal relative to its Divisions; rather, it is the same tribunal convened in fuller assembly to exercise specific and limited appellate jurisdiction as vested by the law, not a higher court in a hierarchical sense.
In this regard, the Court declared in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay:[46]
The actions taken and the decisions rendered by any of the divisions are those of the Court itself, considering that the divisions are not considered separate and distinct courts but as divisions of one and the same court.[47]
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kepco Ilijan Corporation,[48] the Court confirmed that the foregoing principle is likewise applicable to other collegiate courts such as the CTA. In said case, We also stressed the need to preserve the principle that there can be no hierarchy within a collegial court between its Divisions and the En Banc, viz.:
But the law and the rules are silent when it comes to a situation similar to the case at bar, in which a court, in this case the Court of Tax Appeals, is called upon to annul its own judgment. More specifically, in the case at bar, the CTA sitting en banc is being asked to annul a decision of one of its divisions. However, the laws creating the CTA and expanding its jurisdiction ([Republic Act] Nos. 1125 and 9282) and the court’s own rules of procedure (the Revised Rules of the CTA) do not provide for such a scenario.
It is the same situation among other collegial courts. To illustrate, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals may sit and adjudicate cases in divisions consisting of only a number of members, and such adjudication is already regarded as the decision of the Court itself. It is provided for in the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4 (1) and BP Blg. 129, Section 4, respectively. The divisions are not considered separate and distinct courts but are divisions of one and the same court; there is no hierarchy of courts within the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, for they each remain as one court notwithstanding that they also work in divisions. The Supreme Court sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis-a-vis its divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. As for the Court of Appeals en banc, it sits as such only for the purpose of exercising administrative, ceremonial, or other non-adjudicatory functions.
Thus, it appears contrary to these features that a collegial court, sitting en banc, may be called upon to annul a decision of one of its divisions which had become final and executory, for it is tantamount to allowing a court to annul its own judgment and acknowledging that a hierarchy exists within such court. In the process, it also betrays the principle that judgments must, at some point, attain finality. A court that can revisit its own final judgments leaves the door open to possible endless reversals or modifications which is anathema to a stable legal system.
Thus, the Revised Rules of the CTA and even the Rules of Court which apply suppletorily thereto provide for no instance in which the en banc may reverse, annul or void a final decision of a division. Verily, the Revised Rules of the CTA provide for no instance of an annulment of judgment at all. On the other hand, the Rules of Court, through Rule 47, provides, with certain conditions, for annulment of judgment done by a superior court, like the Court of Appeals, against the final judgment, decision or ruling of an inferior court, which is the Regional Trial Court, based on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court, in turn, also is empowered to, upon a similar action, annul a judgment or ruling of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts within its territorial jurisdiction. But, again, the said Rules are silent as to whether a collegial court sitting en banc may annul a final judgment of its own division.
As earlier explained, the silence of the Rules may be attributed to the need to preserve the principles that there can be no hierarchy within a collegial court between its divisions and the en banc, and that a court’s judgment, once final, is immutable.[49] (Citations omitted, italics in the original, emphasis supplied)
Since the CTA is a collegial court, the CTA Divisions cannot be treated as “lower courts,” but merely as functional configurations of the same judicial entity. The jurisdiction exercised by the CTA Division is not inferior to that of the CTA En Banc. As a matter of legal and structural principle, both the CTA En Banc and the CTA Division are co-equal manifestations of the same judicial entity.
The Court, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals Second Division,[50] citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals,[51] has firmly held that the CTA En Banc exercises appellate jurisdiction only over final judgments or orders, never interlocutory ones. This limitation stems in part from the CTA’s unique internal structure, which does not allow for continual or piecemeal review of a case. The remedy of certiorari presupposes the existence of a judicial hierarchy between the reviewing court and the tribunal being reviewed. In this case, such a hierarchy is absent between the CTA En Banc and the CTA Divisions.
Thus, treating the CTA En Banc as hierarchically superior would be both conceptually erroneous and jurisprudentially indefensible.
The CTA En Banc’s authority to review final decisions, resolutions, or orders of a CTA Division does not make it a separate or higher court, nor does it give supervisory power to issue a writ of certiorari against its Divisions
It must be stressed that under the RRCTA, the CTA En Banc’s appellate jurisdiction is limited to decisions or resolutions resolving motions for reconsideration or new trial filed before the CTA Divisions. This presupposes that the case subject to appellate review involves a judgment on the merits or a final disposition. The RRCTA is silent on whether the CTA En Banc also exercises original jurisdiction over interlocutory orders or judgments of one of its divisions.[52]
On this note, when the language of a statute or provision is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, “it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation."[53] Thus:
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the index of intention.” Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the words of a statute there should be no departure."[54]
Given the above disquisition, the CTA En Banc’s appellate authority is limited to final decisions, resolutions, or orders of the CTA Division—not interlocutory orders thereof—and does not equate to a grant of supervisory authority akin to that exercised by a higher court over a lower court. Neither does it vest supervisory powers to issue writs of certiorari against the CTA Divisions.
First, appellate jurisdiction is inherently limited to the review of final adjudications. It contemplates the correction of errors in final determinations, not the intervention in ongoing proceedings through supervisory writs such as certiorari. As the Court held in Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[55] there are substantial distinctions between an “appeal” and “certiorari,” particularly as to their purpose and subject matter:
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, [W]e explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court — on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact — a mistake of judgment — appeal is the remedy.
. . . .
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.[56] (Emphases supplied.)
Clearly, appellate jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction serve two entirely different legal purposes.
Appellate jurisdiction allows a court to review, reverse, affirm, or modify the final judgment or final order. It requires that the proceedings are completed and that a final disposition of the issues has been made. Supervisory jurisdiction, exercised through certiorari under Rule 65, on the other hand, is a remedy available while proceedings are still ongoing. It addresses errors of jurisdiction—situations where the tribunal concerned acted without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It interrupts or corrects proceedings before final judgment to prevent unlawful exercise of judicial power.
As mentioned, the CTA En Banc’s jurisdiction to review decisions of the CTA Divisions is confined to final judgments or final orders, as set forth in Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282:
SEC. 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. — No civil proceeding involving matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local Government Code shall be maintained, except as herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA en banc. (Emphasis supplied.)
Nothing in the law authorizes the CTA En Banc to intervene in interlocutory matters (i.e., orders issued during the course of a case that do not yet fully and finally resolve the parties’ rights). As such, the CTA En Banc may review a CTA Division’s decision only after the case has been finally decided or completely disposed of—not while the case remains pending.
Supervisory control over ongoing proceedings of the CTA Division would require a different and separate legal authority—one that is not granted by the statutes governing the CTA. Supervisory jurisdiction requires an express power to intervene in mid-proceeding to annul or correct actions not yet final. No such supervisory power, as distinguished from appellate power, is granted to the CTA En Banc over the CTA Divisions. It thus, follows that only a higher and distinct court, i.e., the Supreme Court possesses supervisory power over the CTA, whether sitting En Banc or in division.
For these reasons, it is clear that the CTA En Banc’s appellate jurisdiction over final decisions, resolutions or orders does not equate to authority to control or supervise interlocutory matters pending before the CTA Divisions. The functions are distinct: appellate jurisdiction deals with completed proceedings, whereas supervisory jurisdiction through certiorari deals with ongoing proceedings. The CTA En Banc has only the former.
If the CTA En Banc could intervene via certiorari in pending cases before a CTA Division, this would disrupt the judicial process by confusing the distinct roles of appellate review (which occurs after finality) and supervisory intervention (which occurs during pendency). Furthermore, it would burden the CTA En Banc with acting both as an appellate reviewer and as a supervisory overseer, which, as aforesaid, is not its intended function under the law.
Second, the CTA is created as one court, not a two-tiered judicial entity. As earlier noted, nothing in Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, authorizes the CTA En Banc to act as an external supervisor over the CTA Divisions. To imply such a supervisory relationship would be to legislate beyond the statute and alter the fundamental design of the CTA as a singular collegiate court.
Third, to characterize the CTA En Banc as a “higher tribunal” relative to the CTA Divisions would violate the principle that jurisdiction must be clearly and explicitly granted by law, never presumed. As the Court accentuated as early as 1982 in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Martinez,[57] jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt.
It thus follows that allowing a Rule 65 certiorari petition against a CTA Division’s interlocutory order before the CTA En Banc would improperly expand the Court En Banc’s statutory appellate function, contrary to the doctrine that jurisdiction cannot be presumed and must be conferred expressly and unequivocally by law.
Implications on Collegiality and Judicial Impartiality
Allowing a certiorari petition against an interlocutory order issued by a CTA Division to be heard by the CTA En Banc creates a procedural conundrum: the possibility that the very same justices who issued the challenged order would then adjudicate the alleged grave abuse of discretion stemming from their own actions.
At the heart of the judicial system lies the age-old legal maxim: nemo debet esse judex in propria causa (which translates to no man shall be a judge in his own cause).[58] This legal principle safeguards the integrity of adjudication by ensuring that disputes are resolved by neutral and impartial decision-makers. To allow the members of the CTA Division to sit in review of their own alleged grave abuse of discretion would erode public confidence in the Judiciary. Moreover, it would gravely undermine the appearance of fairness and judicial neutrality, which are indispensable to the administration of justice.
As pronounced in the case of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete,[59] the primary purpose of certiorari is to ensure that lower courts and tribunals stay within the limits of their lawful authority, protecting due process and preventing injustice from escalating. Although ordinary appeals can correct errors, certiorari exists as a faster, special remedy when the trial court’s error is so serious and potentially damaging that waiting for a full appeal would worsen the harm, viz.:
The essential purpose of certiorari is to keep the proceedings in lower judicial courts and tribunals within legal bounds, so that due process and the rule of law may prevail at all times and arbitrariness, whimsicality and unfairness which justice abhors may immediately be stamped out before graver injury, juridical and otherwise, ensues. While generally these objectives may well be attained in an ordinary appeal, it is undoubtedly the better rule to allow the special remedy of certiorari at the option of the party adversely affected, when the irregularity committed by the trial court is so grave and so far reaching in its consequences that the long and cumbersome procedure of appeal will only further aggravate the situation of the aggrieved party because other untoward actuations are likely to materialize as natural consequences of those already perpetrated. If the law were otherwise, certiorari would have no reason at all for being.[60]
Bearing in mind the essential purpose of certiorari, participation by the same justices in reviewing their own interlocutory acts creates an intolerable risk of actual or perceived bias. Even if recusals could technically be sought or required, the very possibility that such ‘self-review’ could occur within the same tribunal undermines the structural impartiality demanded of judicial proceedings. Indeed, in In re: Ong,[61] the Court emphasized the importance of impartiality and propriety in the conduct of the members of the bench, to wit:
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
. . . .
Judges must, at all times, he beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that ‘[p]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.’[62] [Emphasis in the original]
So too, this structural flaw cannot be cured by the internal reconstitution of the En Banc’s membership. The issue is not merely the participation of individual justices, but the fact that the same judicial entity—without external review—would be tasked to sit in judgment over its own prior conduct.
It must be emphasized that the procedural device of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is designed to serve as an “external check” upon grave abuse of discretion by a lower tribunal. It presupposes a relationship between distinct judicial bodies—one subordinate, and the other superior.[63] The fact that some of the members of the CTA En Banc are also members of the CTA Division that rendered the assailed order only reinforces the premise that the CTA En Banc is not superior to its Divisions; it is merely a different organizational configuration of the same Court. Thus, it is institutionally inappropriate for it to exercise certiorari jurisdiction over interlocutory rulings issued by its own Divisions.
As aptly observed by Justice Bacorro-Villena in her Separate Concurring Opinion in the proceedings below, if the CTA, sitting En Banc, were to find grounds to issue a writ of certiorari against its own Division, it would, in effect, be declaring that it had itself gravely abused its discretion in a manner so wanton, arbitrary, and oppressive as to warrant extraordinary judicial correction.[64]
To put things in proper perspective, the Justices who sit En Banc are the same Justices who compose the Divisions; thus, a certiorari proceeding would invite them to pass judgment either on their own interlocutory acts or those of their immediate colleagues or equals. Such a situation fundamentally distorts the nature of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which exists to address only the gravest abuses of discretion amounting to a virtual refusal to perform a positive duty, or acts done with evident passion or hostility, beyond the bounds of lawful authority.[65]
The consequences would be detrimental to the integrity of the institution. First, it would erode the principle of collegiality, as judicial deliberation and mutual respect would be supplanted by a climate of internal scrutiny and distrust—turning judicial dialogue into judicial surveillance. Second, it would create an inherent conflict of interest, placing Justices in the untenable position of sitting in judgment over the professional conduct of their own peers or even themselves. Third, it would inevitably foster a public perception of bias, inconsistency, or institutional disarray, thereby corroding public confidence in the impartiality and credibility of the CTA as a judicial body.
Accordingly, the proper recourse, consistent with the structure of the Judiciary and the nature of certiorari as an extraordinary remedy, is to elevate questions of grave abuse of discretion involving interlocutory orders to a higher and distinct tribunal—the Supreme Court. To hold otherwise would not only distort the remedy of certiorari, but would also undermine the very principles of due process, collegiality, and judicial impartiality that every litigant is entitled to expect from the CTA.
The alleged implied authority of the CTA En Banc to entertain certiorari petitions against interlocutory orders of a CTA Division cannot be deemed as an inherent power emanating from the grant of its appellate jurisdiction
In City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo,[66] the Court ruled that for any appellate court such as the CTA to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must necessarily possess the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. Accordingly, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution, as well as inherent in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, viz.:
Indeed, in order for any appellate court, to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
. . . .
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that “if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that “a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.” The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo and Bulilis v. Nuez.
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners’ contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter — precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter.
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of [Republic Act] No. 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court’s jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.
Thus, this Court has held that “while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it and subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates.” Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of ifs appellate jurisdiction.[67] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Although the Court adjudged that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to a CTA Division over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction, the same cannot be said with respect to the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA En Banc over tax cases filed in and decided by a CTA Division. It must be emphasized that in Grecia-Cuerdo, two distinct courts were involved—the CTA and the RTC—and the CTA exercises appellate jurisdiction over the RTC in relation to local tax cases.
Unlike the CTA Division and the RTC, which are separate and distinct judicial entities, no relationship of superiority exists between the CTA En Banc and the CTA Division, as they are merely different organizational configurations of the same judicial entity. Although the CTA En Banc exercises appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of its Divisions, they still constitute one court.
This distinction is critical when considering the voting requirements for reversing a decision of a CTA Division. As Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, explicitly states, five affirmative votes from the CTA En Banc are necessary to reverse a Division’s decision in an ordinary appeal. This strict threshold applies even when an interlocutory order’s reversal leads to the overall reversal of a Division’s decision. However, if the same interlocutory order were challenged via a certiorari petition alleging grave abuse of discretion, only a simple majority of Justices present would be required for reversal.
This dissonance would allow circumvention of the normal appeals process and flood the CTA En Banc with certiorari petitions, thereby undermining both procedural order and the extraordinary nature of the writ.
Given that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy intended to correct grave errors of jurisdiction. committed during the pendency of a case—not after finality—its exercise must be directed to a higher and distinct tribunal. Since the CTA En Banc and its Divisions are merely different conformations of the same collegial body, the Supreme Court is the proper forum for addressing grave abuse of discretion in interlocutory orders from a CTA Division, not the CTA En Banc. Any other interpretation would distort the CTA’s structural design, compromise judicial impartiality, and impede the orderly administration of justice.
Legislative intent does not support granting the CTA En Banc certiorari jurisdiction over interlocutory orders issued by its divisions
In addition to the above disquisition, as raised by the esteemed Justice Caguioa in the deliberations, the legislative intent behind Republic Act No. 9282 does not support the characterization of the CTA En Banc as a superior tribunal over its own divisions. Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, in his sponsorship speech before Republic Act No. 9282 became a law, clarified the purpose of the amendment:[68]
This bill is entitled “An Act Expanding The Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Elevating Its Rank to the Level of a Collegiate Court With Special Jurisdiction and Enlarging Its Membership, Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1125, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Law Creating the Court of Tax Appeals and For Other Purposes.”
The measure also expands the organization and most importantly its level is raised to that of the Court of Appeals.
. . . .
Mr. President, another important feature of this measure is that appeals from decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals are no longer appealable to the Court of Appeals. Under the modified appeal procedure, the decision of a division of the Court of Tax Appeals may be appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals en banc. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc may in turn be directly appealed to the Supreme Court only on a question of law. This is expected to facilitate court proceedings in tax cases since the Court of Tax Appeals has admittedly the necessary expertise in tax matters. Moreover, there will be less divisive rulings on tax matters since appeal shall be made only to the Court of Tax Appeals en banc instead of the Court of Appeals with its many divisions.[69] (Emphasis supplied)
Republic Act No. 9282 did not create a hierarchy between the CTA En Banc and its divisions. It simply granted the CTA En Banc an exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final decisions or resolutions issued by its divisions. In essence, Republic Act No. 9282 established an appellate structure that allows the full court to collectively review rulings of its divisions.
There is no language in the Committee Hearing indicating that Congress viewed the CTA Division and the CTA En Banc as institutionally independent courts. On the contrary, the deliberations point to a single specialized court, structured internally into Divisions and En Banc for functional efficiency. To infer otherwise from generalized remarks is to read more into the record than its text or context permits.
In sum, as Justice Caguioa highlighted, the legislative deliberations do not support the proposition that the CTA En Banc was meant to exercise certiorari jurisdiction over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division. What they confirm is the realignment of appellate functions and the desire for review of final judgments within the CTA before proceeding to the Court. There is no indication that Congress intended to create two distinct courts within the CTA. What the deliberations instead reveal is a structural realignment such that appeals from CTA Divisions, which would previously have been brought to the CA, were to be resolved by the CTA En Banc to promote judicial specialization and efficiency in tax adjudication.[70]
Petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders of CTA Divisions are cognizable by the Supreme Court
Finally, the Court again underlines that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an original or independent action premised on the public respondent having acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, since a certiorari petition is not a continuation of the appellate process borne out of the original case but is a separate action focused on actions that are in excess or wanting of jurisdiction, then it cannot be filed in the same tribunal whose actions are being assailed but is instead cognizable by a higher tribunal which, in the case of the CTA, is this Court.[71]
Parenthetically, as astutely reminded by Justice Dimaampao in the deliberations,[72] our Rules of Court do not allow appeals for interlocutory orders.[73] The reason is rooted in necessity and in recognizing the fallibility of human judgment. Judges should be allowed to correct interlocutory orders while the case remains within their jurisdiction. In addition, the prohibition seeks to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action which adds significant delay to the proceedings and the resolution of cases.[74] Hence, interlocutory orders may only be assailed by a writ of certiorari.
Without a doubt, the Court has ruled against the power of the CTA En Banc to issue writs of certiorari on interlocutory orders of the CTA Division, as these interlocutory orders should be properly subject to a Rule 65 petition before the Supreme Court.[75]
A review of jurisprudence shows that the Court has consistently ruled against the authority of the CTA En Banc to take cognizance of certiorari petitions on interlocutory orders of the CTA Division for two reasons: (1) Republic Act No. 9282 and the RRCTA do not provide for such certiorari jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc, and (2) a petition for certiorari is a special civil action raising issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction; thus, it cannot be filed in the same tribunal whose actions are being assailed. Instead, it is cognizable by a higher tribunal, which, in the case of the CTA, is the Supreme Court.
Indeed, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals,[76] it was clarified that the CTA En Banc has jurisdiction over final order or judgment but not over interlocutory orders issued by the CTA Division.[77] In said case, it was explained that a petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme Court is the proper remedy to assail interlocutory orders issued by the CTA.[78]
This was further underlined in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals (First Division),[79] where the Court held that the CTA En Banc has no jurisdiction over the CTA Division’s denial of the omnibus motion, being an interlocutory order. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals-Third Division,[80] the Court reiterated said rule on jurisdiction and adjudged that being interlocutory orders, the assailed Resolutions therein were the proper subject of a Rule 65 petition. This is again underscored in the more recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals Second Division,[81] where it was repeated that the CTA En Banc has jurisdiction over a final judgment or order, but not over an interlocutory order issued by the CTA Division.
Moreover, the writ of certiorari is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts arid tribunals from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction.[82]
It also bears stressing that this Court has not recused itself in, refused to act upon, or ordered the remand to the CTA En Banc of, petitions for certiorari filed before the Court assailing interlocutory orders of the CTA Division.
Conclusion
To summarize, the CTA En Banc has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari against interlocutory orders issued by a CTA Division. First, the CTA En Banc’s jurisdiction is strictly appellate; besides, the exercise of certiorari presupposes a relationship of superiority. Second, to rule that a hierarchy exists between the CTA En Banc and the CTA Divisions is contrary to the CTA’s very nature as a collegial body. Third, the CTA En Banc’s authority to review final decisions, resolutions, or orders of a CTA Division does not transform it into a separate or superior court, nor does it vest it with supervisory power to issue a writ of certiorari against its Divisions. Fourth, it is inappropriate to allow members of the CTA Division to sit as members of the CTA En Banc and pass judgment on their own actions in a certiorari proceeding. Fifth, the supposed authority of the CTA En Banc to entertain certiorari petitions cannot be considered an inherent power implied from its appellate jurisdiction, as it is neither essential to its existence nor consistent with its dignity and function. Sixth, legislative intent does not support granting the CTA En Banc certiorari jurisdiction over interlocutory orders issued by its Divisions. Ultimately, petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders of the CTA Divisions are cognizable by the Supreme Court.
In fine, the rule of law demands both substance and form. The structure of the CTA, the limited scope of the CTA En Banc’s jurisdiction, the need for judicial impartiality, and the nature of certiorari as a remedy all point to the same conclusion: the CTA En Banc has no jurisdiction over interlocutory orders issued by its own Divisions via a Rule 65 petition.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated August 29, 2023 and Resolution dated January 26, 2024 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur. Leonen,* SAJ., on official leave but left dissenting opinion. Caguioa, J., see concurring. Lazaro-Javier, J., please see dissent. Inting, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion. M. Lopez, J., please see dissenting opinion. Rosario, J., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Javier. Singh,** J., concurring and on leave.