[ G.R. No. 270086. September 30, 2025 ] EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 270086. September 30, 2025 ]
MIRACLE HEIGHTS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND ERNESTO LIM, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS-FORMER NINTH DIVISION AND SPS. MARIO AND ADELAIDA AMPARO, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
LOPEZ, J.:
This Court resolves the Petition for Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed and set aside the Decision[4] and Resolution[5] of the Office of the President (OP). The CA reinstated the Decision[6] and Resolution[7] of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), and dismissed the Complaint[8] filed by Spouses Mario and Adelaida Amparo (Spouses Amparo) for the suspension and/or revocation of Miracle Heights Development Corporation’s (MHDC) Certificate of Registration and/or License to Sell (CR/LS).
Facts
Spouses Amparo filed a Complaint[9] against MHDC and Ernesto Lim (Lim) before the HLURB Regional Field Office No. IV for the suspension and/or the revocation of MHDC’s CR/LS with prayer for the imposition of fines and/or other penalties, alleging unsound real estate business practices on the part of MHDC.[10]
According to Spouses Amparo, they are the lawful and registered owners of two parcels of land at Barangay Antipolo (Brgy. Antipolo), Lipa City, which are adjacent to and located at the lower portion of MHDC. These parcels of land are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 67020 and 61214 issued by the Registry of Deeds for Lipa City. Spouses Amparo protested MHDC’s construction of a cemented canal directly descending to and pointing toward their properties. In their Complaint, they alleged that the construction would cause great damage to their properties and expose their health and well-being to the hazard of floods and waste matter that come with it.[11]
Since MHDC and Lim failed to timely file their answer, Spouses Amparo moved for MHDC and Lim to be declared in default.[12]
The HLURB then issued an order declaring MHDC and Lim in default.[13]
Spouses Amparo submitted their position paper and draft decision in line with the HLURB Rules. They emphasized that MHDC’s CR/LS should be suspended and/or revoked because its issuance and its continuing grant “is predicated on the proper observance of the law and due regard for the property rights of others."[14] They also argued that MHDC’s construction of the cemented canal constitutes as an unsound real estate business practice.[15]
The HLURB issued a Judgment by Default[16] in favor of Spouses Amparo, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [MHDC and Lim] to cease and desist from selling lots or units at Miracle Heights Subdivision until further ordered by this Office.
Further, [MHDC] is hereby ordered to pay this Board [PHP 10,000.00] as administrative fine for violation of Section 20 of [Presidential Decree No.] 957.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The Housing and Land Use arbiter ruled that the issues posed by Spouses Amparo involved the CR/LS in relation to the development of Miracle Heights Subdivision, particularly, the drainage outfall. According to the arbiter, since MHDC and Lim are the developer and owner, respectively, of the Miracle Heights Subdivision, they are obliged to complete the project in accordance with the approved development plan. However, it was found that MHDC did not submit a subdivision development plan. In its absence, the arbiter had to rely on the ocular inspection and other documents submitted by MHDC. The arbiter was convinced that there was a valid ground to issue a Cease and Desist Order until an Approved Development Plan or Alteration Plan indicating the proper draining system and drainage outfall has been submitted to the HLURB.[18]
The HLURB then issued a writ of execution upon Spouses Amparo’s motion.[19]
MHDC and Lim subsequently filed a compliance with motion to lift the cease and desist order. MHDC and Lim averred that they have paid the administrative fine imposed upon them, and that they re-submitted the Development Plans for Miracle Heights Subdivision to the HLURB Region IV-A. They also prayed to be allowed to sell lots or units at Miracle Heights Subdivision.[20]
The arbiter directed the Development Monitoring Group of the HLURB to conduct another ocular inspection at the Miracle Heights Subdivision to determine whether MHDC and Lim have complied with the proper drainage system, in accordance with the development plan.[21]
A second ocular inspection was conducted.[22]
The arbiter denied MHDC and Lim’s motion to lift the cease and desist order. According to the arbiter, MHDC and Lim’s payment of administrative fine and submission of a new set of engineering development plans without the concerned local government unit’s approval does not amount to compliance with the writ of execution. The findings of the Development Monitoring Group in their ocular inspection showed that MHDC had not complied with the writ of execution to warrant the lifting of the cease and desist order.[23]
MHDC and Lim then filed an appeal memorandum before the HLURB Board of Commissioners. MHDC and Lim averred in their appeal that the CA already previously ruled on a similar case also filed by Spouses Amparo.
Spouses Amparo had previously instituted a complaint against MHDC, contending that the latter’s act of cementing the existing waterway increased the burden of the easement imposed on their property to receive the waters descending from the higher estates, entitling them to recover damages.[24] In that case, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided in favor of Spouses Amparo and ordered the removal and/or destruction of the cemented waterway. The CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 70164 dismissed Spouses Amparo’s complaint for lack of merit.[25] They then sought recourse before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 179304. However, their Petition was denied in this Court’s October 8, 2007 Resolution. It became final and executory on June 5, 2008.
MHDC argued that the action before the HLURB should have already been barred by res judicata. MHDC also argued that the Development Monitoring Group in the ocular inspection’s findings are contrary to the CA’s findings, as affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 179304.[26] According to MHDC, they have submitted the development plans, which have already been approved by the local government unit.[27]
Spouses Amparo interposed their counter memorandum.[28]
The HLURB Board of Commissioners rendered a Decision[29] that denied MHDC and Lim’s appeal. According to the Board, the issues were not barred by res judicata. There was no identity of issues and the relief sought because the case filed before the regular court was a civil case for damages, while the case before the HLURB sought the suspension of MHDC and Lim’s CR/LS. As for MHDC and Lim’s compliance with the requirements for the lifting of the cease and desist order, the Board pointed out that the submitted development plan did not bear the local government unit’s approval.[30]
MHDC and Lim filed their motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the HLURB in its Decision.[31]
MHDC and Lim appealed[32] to the OP. First, MHDC and Lim argued that the HLURB had no jurisdiction over the complaint because under Resolution No. 81.1., series of 2011, entitled “Promulgating the 2011 Revised Rules of Procedure of the [HLURB,]” actions concerning unsound real estate business must be filed by buyers of real estate. Since Spouses Amparo were not buyers of lots by MHDC, the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the complaint.[33] Second, the previous CA decision should be deemed conclusive upon the HLURB by reason of res judicata.[34] Third, MHDC had already submitted the development plans, which has been approved by the local government unit.[35] Lastly, MHDC and Lim argued that MHDC was not engaged in unsound business practice.[36]
In their Comment,[37] Spouses Amparo assailed MHDC and Lim’s appeal before the OP for being filed out of time, pursuant to Section 1 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18, Series of 1987 and Rule 20, Section 1(6) of the 2009 HLURB Rules of Procedure. They also argued that: (1) HLURB has jurisdiction over the case because Spouses Amparo were neighboring property owners of MHDC; (2) the CA’s decision did not categorically rule on the propriety of the drainage system found in Miracle Heights Subdivision and that the principle of res judicata cannot be invoked because the previous civil case for damages have different issues and reliefs involved, as compared to the case at bar; (3) MHDC and Lim are guilty of unsound real estate business practices based on the findings from the ocular inspection; and (4) the denial of the lifting of the cease and desist order was justified in view of MHDC and Lim’s failure to submit an approved development plan or alteration plan.[38]
In its Decision,[39] the OP dismissed Spouses Amparo’s Complaint before the HLURB. The OP ruled upon the issues of res judicata and the HLURB’s jurisdiction over Spouses Amparo’s complaint. According to the OP:
To start with, this Office finds that the issues raised in the final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals are different from the issues raised in the instant complaint. In the former, the Amparos had alleged bad faith on the part of the developer in building the subject cemented waterway, and prayed for damages or account thereof as a principal relief. In the latter case, the Amparos, alleging damages arising from the same act of the developer, is principally seeking the suspension of the developer’s certificate of registration and license to sell. It is clear that the instant complaint is hardly barred by [res judicata] because it raises a different issue and springs from a cause of action different from that obtaining in the final decision of the Court of Appeals.
Be that as it may, this Office finds that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the complaint. The Amparos based their cause of action on unsound real estate business practice under Section 1(a), [Presidential Decree No.] 1344. They are, however, not buyers of any lot in the subdivision but are, rather, merely owners of a property adjacent to it.
. . . .
Hence, the Amparos may not invoke Section 1(a), [Presidential Decree No.] 1344 as they are not buyers of a lot in MHDC’s subdivision project.[40]
Spouses Amparo filed a motion for reconsideration, which the OP denied.[41]
Spouses Amparo then filed a Petition for Review[42] under Rule 43 before the CA, which it granted as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated April 26, 2016 and Resolution dated April 7, 2022 issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 11-I-280 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 9, 2011 and Resolution dated July 21, 2011 of the HLURB Board of Commissioners Second Division in HLURB Case No. REM-A-110107-01333 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.[43]
The CA found that the OP incorrectly took cognizance of MHDC and Lim’s appeal. The “fresh period” in Neypes v. Court of Appeals[44] states that a litigant is allowed a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal from the previous court which decided the case, counted from the receipt of the dismissal of a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. However, the Neypes ruling only covers judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and not those cases which are administrative in nature.[45] Where the subject appeal is administrative in nature such as an appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP, the Neypes ruling does not apply. Section 1 of A.O. No. 18[46] provides that the time during which a motion for reconsideration has been pending with the ministry or agency concerned shall be deducted from the period for filing an appeal.[47]
The CA found that MHDC and Lim received a copy of the HLURB Board of Commissioners’ Decision on June 17, 2011. They had 15 days from receipt or until July 2, 2011 to file their appeal. Instead of filing an appeal, MHDC and Lim filed their motion for reconsideration on July 1, 2011, or 14 days after receipt of the HLURB Decision. MHDC received the Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration on August 19, 2011. Applying Section 1 of A.O. No. 18, MHDC and Lim only had one day from August 19, 2011 or until August 20, 2011 to file their appeal to the OP because the filing of the motion for reconsideration merely suspended the running of the 15-day period. However, MHDC and Lim filed their appeal only on September 2, 2011. Thus, their appeal to the OP was already 13 days late and the HLURB Decision had become final and executory.[48]
Hence, MHDC and Lim filed a Petition for Certiorari[49] before this Court.
This Court resolves the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s findings against petitioners Miracle Heights Development Corporation and Ernesto Lim, and when it held that Miracle Heights Development Corporation and Ernesto Lim’s appeal before the Office of the President was filed out of time.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Petitioners aver that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over the Complaint filed by respondents Spouses Amparo.[50]
In respondents’ Comment, they argue that: (1) the Petition for Certiorari should be dismissed considering that there is an appeal available to petitioners;[51] (2) HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondents;[52] (3) the HLURB ruled against petitioners based on the absence of an approved development plan;[53] (4) petitioners’ appeal before the OP was filed out of time and hence the HLURB’s decision became final and executory;[54] and (5) the completion of the development plan of the Miracle Heights Subdivision does not render the issues raised before the HLURB moot and academic.[55]
The filing of a Petition for Certiorari before this Court was proper
A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested.[56] Grave abuse of discretion is present “when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."[57] The distinction between a petition for certiorari and a petition for review are as follows:
A petition for [certiorari] seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings. Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.[58] (Citation omitted)
Here, petitioners properly availed of the remedy of certiorari for the following reasons: (1) the writ is directed against the CA, which exercised its judicial functions; (2) the CA has acted without jurisdiction when it gave due course to petitioners’ appeal; and (3) petitioners could not have successfully availed of the remedy of appeal by certiorari or the filing of a petition for review on certiorari, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[59]
The HLURB’s jurisdiction to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved, and the parties
Jurisdiction is defined as “the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case."[60] In Bilag v. Ay-ay,[61] this Court emphasized that:
[F]or the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.[62] (Citation omitted)
Before a court should decide on the merits of the case, it is essential that a court or tribunal first determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter.[63] A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime,[64] even for the first time on appeal.[65]
This is because a void judgment creates no rights and produces no legal effect.[66] By exception, the-doctrine of estoppel by laches may operate to bar jurisdictional challenges, pursuant to the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. [67]
Records reveal that it was in 2008 when respondents filed a Complaint against petitioners before the HLURB for unsound real estate business practices. When the HLURB Board of Commissioners ruled in favor of respondents, and denied petitioner’s appeal and motion for reconsideration, petitioners appealed to the OP.[68] In petitioners’ appeal before the OP, they raised that the HLURB does not have jurisdiction over the case. While it took petitioners from year 2008 when the complaint was filed until 2011. We find that the lapse of three years is a reasonable length of time to raise the issue of jurisdiction. This may even be raised for the first time on appeal as it is not barred by estoppel. The general rule that a void judgment may be attacked anytime is applicable to this case.
An overview of the HLURB’s jurisdiction as regards unsound real estate business practices
On July 31, 1975, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757.[69] One of the powers vested upon the NHA is to “[p]rescribe and enforce guidelines, standards[,] and rules in the manner provided for in such rules and regulations promulgated and adopted by the [NHA] designed to protect home and lot buyers through the regulation of the real estate trade and business[.]"[70]
A year after, or on May 13, 1976, Presidential Decree No. 93371 created the Human Settlements Commission to formulate human settlements perspectives and policies, and to adopt and to implement measures for ensuring the safety and wholesomeness of life in our communities, in consideration of space, efficient land use, equity in resources distribution, and rational relationship amongst our communities.[72]
On April 2, 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1344[73] defined the NHA’s exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving unsound real estate business practices.[74]
Through Presidential Decree No. 1396,[75] the Department of Human Settlements was founded to supervise government corporations, authorities and agencies relating to housing, including the Human Settlements Commission and the NHA.[76] The Human Settlements Commission was subsequently converted to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission,[77] while the Department of Human Settlements was converted to the Ministry of Human Settlements when the Philippines shifted to a parliamentary form of government under Ferdinand E. Marcos’s regime.[78]
As to the NHA, its powers were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission pursuant to Executive Order No. 648.[79] One of the NHA’s regulatory functions that was transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission include the “[r]egulation of the real estate trade and business[.]"[80]
In 1986, Executive Order No. 90 abolished the Ministry of Human Settlements[81] and created the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council.[82] The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission was renamed as the HLURB.[83] The former HLURB was reconstituted as the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) to which the adjudicatory functions of the HLURB were transferred.[84] At present, the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council and the HLURB have been consolidated into the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development pursuant to Republic Act No. 11201.[85]
Having discussed the history of the Human Settlements Commission, We now focus the discussion on the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving unsound real estate business practices.
The first mention of the NHA’s exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving unsound real estate business practices was in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1344, which provides:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices[.]
Other relevant resolutions, law, and implementing rules and regulations (IRR) pertaining to jurisdiction in resolving unsound real estate business practices are as follows: (1) HLURB Resolution No. 871-11; (2) HSAC En Banc Resolution No. 8, s. 2021; (3) Republic Act No. 11201; and (4) the IRR of Republic Act No. 11201.
In 2011, the HLURB issued HLURB Resolution No. 871-11. Rule 1, Section 2 of this resolution limits the applicability of the HLURB Rules to disputes or controversies involving “actions concerning unsound real estate business practices filed by buyers."[86]
In 2021, the HSAC issued HSAC En Banc Resolution No. 8, s. 2021, Section 2(a)(1)[87] of this resolution specifies that actions concerning unsound real estate business practices filed by buyers or homeowners are within the jurisdiction of the HSAC:
SECTION 2. Coverage. — These Rules shall govern the proceedings before the HSAC, and shall apply to the following disputes or controversies:
(a)
Cases involving subdivisions, condominiums, memorial parks, and similar real estate developments:
(1)
Actions concerning unsound real estate business practices filed by buyers or homeowners against the project owner or developer, which cause prejudice to the buyers, or which are committed with bad faith and in disregard of the buyer’s rights[.]
As regards the law, the most recent amendment on the jurisdiction of the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development is Republic Act No. 11201. Section 16 (a)(1) of Republic Act No. 11201 provides:
SECTION 16. Jurisdiction of Regional Adjudicators. — The Regional Adjudicators shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following:
(a)
Cases involving subdivisions, condominiums, memorial parks and similar real estate developments:
(1)
Actions concerning unsound real estate business practices filed by buyers or homeowners against the project owner or developer, which cause prejudice to the buyers or committed with bad faith and disregard of the buyers’ rights[.]
Similarly, the IRR of Republic Act No. 11201 states that the regional adjudicators of the Department of Human Settlement and Urban Development have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving subdivisions where the action concerns unsound real estate business practices filed by buyers or homeowners against the project owner or developer. Section 34 of the IRR provides:
SECTION 34. Jurisdiction of Regional Adjudicators. — The Regional Adjudicators shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the following:
34.1
Cases involving subdivisions, condominiums, memorial parks and similar real estate developments:
(a)
Actions concerning unsound real estate business practices filed by buyers or homeowners against the project owner or developer, which cause prejudice to the buyers or committed with bad faith and disregard of the buyers’ rights[.]
The series of issuances from the HLURB Resolution, the HSAC En Banc Resolution, and Section 16 of Republic Act No. 11201 evinces the intent of Congress to protect the buyers and homeowners of the subdivision from unsound real estate business practices and, thus, limit the jurisdiction of the HLURB (now HSAC) to cases filed by them.
Since respondents had no legal personality to sue when they filed a complaint for unsound real estate business practices before the HLURB, their Complaint must be dismissed
Legal personality to sue refers to the fact that plaintiff is the real party in interest to the case.[88] Rule 3, Section 2[89] of the Rules of Court states that “[a] real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” “A real party in interest is one who possesses a. substantial interest in the case as a result of breach of a legal right."[90] The lack of legal personality to sue or where the respondents are not the real parties-in-interest is a ground for the dismissal of the case, related to the ground that the complaint evidently states no cause of action.[91]
In case of unsound real estate business practices, it is not just the act complained of but also the party complaining that must be examined before the HLURB (now HSAC) may exercise its jurisdiction. As shown by the enactments and issuances mentioned above, the complaint for unsound real estate practice must emanate from buyers of a subdivision lot or condominium unit. This serves as a protection to buyers to give them an exclusive venue to resolve their grievances against subdivision or condominium developers.
In Ortigas & Company, Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals,[92] this Court interpreted Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 as regards the HLURB’s power to hear and decide complaints for unsound real estate business practices against land developers. We ruled in Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership that the offended party in a complaint for unsound real estate business practices must be a buyer of lands involved in development. Otherwise, the complaint must be filed before a court of general jurisdiction, as follows:
Section 1 of [Presidential Decree No.] 1344 vests in the HLURB the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
(a)
unsound real estate business practices;
(b)
claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and
(c)
cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Unlike paragraphs (b) and (c) above, paragraph (a) does not state which party can file a claim against an unsound real estate business practice. But, in the context of the evident objective of Section 1, it is implicit that the “unsound real estate business practice” would, like the offended party in paragraphs (b) and (c), be the buyers of lands involved in development. The policy of the law is to curb unscrupulous practices in real estate trade and business that prejudice buyers.
. . . .
Obviously, the City had not bought a lot in the subject area from Ortigas which would give it a right to seek HLURB intervention in enforcing a local ordinance that regulates the use of private land within its jurisdiction in the interest of the general welfare. It has the right to bring such kind of action but only before a court of general jurisdiction such as the RTC. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Similarly in this case, respondents based their cause of action on unsound real estate business practice under Section 1(a) of Presidential Decree No. 1344. Thus, respondents, who are merely owners of a property adjacent to Miracle Heights Subdivision and are not buyers of any lot in the subject subdivision, erred in filing their complaint with the HLURB (now HSAC). Respondents, who are not buyers of any lot in the subject subdivision, are not the interested parties contemplated under the law and jurisprudence who can file a suit for unsound real estate business practices before the HLURB (now HSAC). Their cause of action lies with the courts of general jurisdiction such as the RTC.
Applying Ortigas & Company, Ltd. Partnership, and as can be gleaned from the amendments of Presidential Decree No. 1344 through Republic Act No. 11201 and other issuances of the HLURB and the HSAC, this Court finds that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the Decision of the OP.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The March 28, 2023 Decision and September 4, 2023 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 173447 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint of respondents Spouses Mario and Adelaida Amparo in HLURB Case No. RIV6-102908-3084 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., Singh, and Villanueva, JJ., concur. Gesmundo,* C.J., on official leave. Leonen,** (Acting C.J.), dissent. See separate opinion. Caguioa,*** J., on official business but left a concurring vote. Lazaro-Javier, J., please see concurrence.