[ G.R. No. 252739. August 19, 2025 ] EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 252739. August 19, 2025 ]
XXX,[1] PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. R E S O L U T I O N
HERNANDO, J.:
The present Motion for Reconsideration[2] seeks to reverse Our April 16, 2024 Decision[3] which affirmed the November 8, 2019 Decision[4] and the June 22, 2022 Resolution[5] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which found XXX guilty of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Antecedents AAA[6] discovered that her spouse, herein petitioner XXX, has been keeping a mistress for four years, with whom he begot a child. Upon confrontation before the barangay, XXX admitted that he was truly the father of the child.[7] AAA was so affected by the incident that she was unable to work for three to four months and could not sleep.[8] AAA then filed a complaint for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 against XXX. For his part, XXX admitted having a child with YYY. However, he denied maintaining any intimate relationship with YYY and asserted that the child was only the result of a one-night stand. He also averred that he did not live with YYY and their child, and that he only visited the child during the July 19, 2016 incident. Thus, he could not have caused AAA emotional and mental anguish.[9] In its Decision[10] dated November 17, 2017, Branch 144, Regional Trial Court of xxxxxxxxxxx[11] (RTC) found XXX guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA sustained XXX’s conviction. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari[12] contending that the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA was caused by his unfaithfulness, and that he did not commit any of the acts mentioned in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. The assailed Decision dated April 16, 2024 denied the Petition and affirmed the challenged decision and resolution of the CA, which held XXX liable for violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. In so ruling, the Court agreed with the RTC and the CA that the elements of the crime charged were successfully proven by the prosecution. It gave credence to the observation of the courts a quo that the mental and emotional anguish suffered by AAA were the result of XXX’s philandering as evidenced by her emotional breakdown while narrating XXX’s infidelity in open court. XXX’s infidelity was the sole source of AAA’s stress and grief. The Court rejected XXX’s argument that AAA’s suffering was caused by his refusal to repair their broken relationship for want of evidence. Finally, the Court gave its stamp of approval on the CA’s ratiocination that an illicit sexual encounter committed by a male person, however casual or infrequent, constitutes marital infidelity that is tantamount to psychological violence punishable by the provisions of Republic Act No. 9262. The fallo of the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. The November 8, 2019 Decision and the June 22, 2022 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40938 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner XXX is found GUILTY of violating Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Petitioner is SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and is ORDERED to (a) pay a fine in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 100,000.00); and (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and report compliance to the Court, as set forth in the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9262. SO ORDERED.[13] (Emphasis in the original)
Unrelenting, XXX files the instant Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the same arguments in his Petition before this Court which were already judiciously passed upon in the Court’s assailed Decision. He insists that marital infidelity is not expressly included in the enumeration of the modes of committing the crime of violence against women and their children. While it is true that under Section 3(a)(C) of Republic Act No. 9262, marital infidelity is constitutive of psychological violence, the same law, however, does not clearly define marital infidelity as one of the modes of committing the crime as defined and penalized under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262.[14] XXX also points out that the assailed Decision of the Court failed to define marital infidelity within the ambit of Republic Act No. 9262. He contends that the ambiguity and vagueness of the definition of marital infidelity as a mode of committing acts of violence against women and children under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 renders the said provision unconstitutional. He further argues that the presumption of deliberate intent in marital infidelity based on societal, cultural, and religious norms is inherently subjective.[15]
Our Ruling
After a careful deliberation, We find the motion for reconsideration bereft of merit. To reiterate, the law itself includes marital infidelity as one of the forms of psychological violence. Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 punishes any form of harassment or violence, i.e., physical, sexual, psychological and economic, that causes mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the woman’s child/children. Corollary to this, Section 3(a)(C) of Republic Act No. 9262 defines “Psychological violence” as acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. To stress, marital infidelity was specifically mentioned in Section 3(a)(C) as constitutive of psychological violence, which evidently falls under the phrase any form of harassment or violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. Besides, the use of the phrase “including, but not limited to” in the examples enumerated in Section 5(i) reveals that the said enumeration is not exclusive. Moreover, a careful review of the enumerated acts of violence against women and children under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9262 reveals that marital infidelity squarely falls under Section 5(i) of the same Act. It is thus unthinkable that the law specifically mentioned marital infidelity as a form of psychological violence under Section 3(a)(C) if it did not intend to punish it anyway under Section 5 thereof. To be sure, Section 5(i) must be read in conjunction with Section 3(a)(C) of Republic Act No. 9262 since a statute must be read or construed as a whole or in its entirety. All parts, provisions, or sections, must be read, considered or construed together, and each must be considered with respect to all others, and in harmony with the whole.[16] Anent XXX’s contention that the ambiguity and vagueness of the definition of “marital infidelity” as a mode of committing acts of violence against women and children under Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 renders the said provision unconstitutional, it must be pointed out that such issue had not been pleaded below and even on appeal to this Court. It is only in the present Motion for Reconsideration that the same had been raised. Settled is the rule that issues that were not alleged or proved before the lower court cannot be decided for the first time on appeal. This rule ensures fairness in proceedings.[17] Thus, XXX is barred from invoking it as an issue before this Court. Further, We reject XXX’s assertion that presumption of deliberate intent in marital infidelity is without basis as the same is not expressly provided in the law. We have painstakingly discussed in Our assailed Decision that the requirement of specific criminal intent to cause mental and emotional suffering is already satisfied the moment the perpetrator commits the act of marital infidelity. This is because marital infidelity is inherently immoral and depraved under prevailing societal, cultural, and religious norms. As articulated by the Court in Regir v. Regir,[18] “[i]t is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain intimate relations with a person other than [their] spouse."[19] Ergo, when the cause of mental or emotional distress is marital infidelity which is inherently wrongful, specific intent is not necessary as the spouse’s intent to cause mental or emotional anguish upon the spouse or their child is already presumed upon the spouse’s mere commission of the act of marital infidelity. This is supported by the language of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. A careful reading of the said provision reveals that the law merely looks at the consequences or effects of marital infidelity upon the aggrieved spouse or child — that is, whether or not the conduct causes mental or emotional anguish to the aggrieved spouse or her child. In contrast, Sections 5(e), 5(f), and 5(h) of the same law specifically requires intent on the part of the violator in order to support a conviction. Verily, the absence of any such term requiring intent on the part of the defendant supports the conclusion that intent is not required in Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262. Finally, it has been made clear in Our assailed Decision that rendering the crime subjective is not, and should not be, the purpose and objective of the law. To echo Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier’s view, the protection of women and children—and no other—is the main objective of Republic Act No. 9262. If We thus seek to fully animate the intent and purpose of the law and truly take upon Ourselves to deliver genuine justice to these women and children, Our vantage point must lie from the eyes of those the law seeks to protect, never from the eyes of those We protect them from or against. For to do the latter would turn a blind eye to the undeniable existence of the injury which the law intends to prevent.[20] It is apt to reiterate that the main thrust of Republic Act No. 9262 is the protection of women and their children. It looks at the effects of a certain act or omission against a woman or her child, rather than the motive of the offender.[21] ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be issued in due course. SO ORDERED. Gesmundo, C.J., Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, J. Lopez, Marquez, and Villanueva, JJ., concur. Leonen, SAJ., maintains his dissent. See separate opinion. Caguioa, J., see dissent. Rosario,* J., no part. Dimaampao, J., maintains his dissent. Kho, Jr., J., maintains his dissent in the main. Singh,** J., on leave.