[ G.R. No. 271967. November 04, 2024 ] 960 Phil. 128
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 271967. November 04, 2024 ]
ROLLY B. LAQUI, SR., PETITIONER, VS. ALEX E. SAGUN, NELIA S. ESPIRITU, KATHERINE MARIE T. SAGUN, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY MARY JANE S. CUEVAS, RESPONDENTS, D E C I S I O N
KHO, JR., J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision[2] dated November 13, 2023 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 173795 affirming in toto the March 3, 2022 Decision[3] of Branch 3, Regional Trial Court, Baguio City (RTC) which affirmed the Judgment[4] dated June 22, 2021 rendered by Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Baguio City (MTCC). The CA ruled that the rendition of the judgment on the pleadings is proper and that petitioner Rolly B. Laqui, Sr. (Laqui) is estopped from assailing the title of respondents Alex E. Sagun, Nelia S. Espiritu, and Katherine Marie T. Sagun (Sagun et al.).
The Facts
Gregorio Espejo died intestate and left a 1,000 square meter property covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 201800169.[5] Pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement[6] dated October 7, 2013, the heirs of Gregorio Espejo agreed to subdivide the property into five equal lots, consisting of 200 square meters each and to apportion each lot to the five siblings and/or immediate heirs of Gregorio and Flora Espejo. Lot 1, situated at No. 54 Manuel Roxas Street, Teacher’s Camp, Baguio City (subject property), was given to Sagun et al. as heirs of Remedios E. Sagun (Remedios).[7] Sagun et al. alleged that on April 15, 2002, Remedios and Laqui entered into an Agreement of Lease[8] over the subject property for a term of two years and for a monthly rental of PHP 6,000.00,[9] which was extended for another two years for a monthly rental of PHP 6,500.00.[10] After the lease agreement expired, the parties did not execute a new contract. Instead, it was impliedly renewed on a month-to-month basis.[11] On March 19, 2019, Sagun et al. demanded Laqui to vacate the premises. Their demand unheeded, Sagun et al. filed a complaint for ejectment (Barangay Case No. 05, Series of 2019) before barangay Manuel Roxas in Baguio City.[12] Afterwards, Laqui received the Summons dated September 16, 2019 issued by the barangay.[13] On September 24, 2019, an Amicable Settlement[14] was reached before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of the barangay,[15] the pertinent portion of which reads:
That Mr. Rolly Laqui Sr. is willing to vacate the area owned by Sagun Family. He is given six months from September 2019 until March 2020. During his stay[,] he shall pay his rental in the amount of Php5,300.00 every end of the month.[16]
However, Laqui failed to comply with their agreement that he will vacate the subject property after the lapse of six months from the date of settlement. Sagun, et al. then filed a Complaint[17] for the enforcement of the Amicable Settlement executed on September 24, 2019 before the MTCC docketed as Civil Case No. 20-20-CV-MTCC.[18] In his Answer,[19] Laqui denied all the allegations against him, except those pertaining to the personal circumstances of Sagun et al., for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material averments.[20] As an affirmative defense, Laqui averred that he cannot be ejected from the subject property, which he claims is part of the Estate of Acopiado, since it was assigned to him by the Estate’s administrator, Daniel Franieza[21] (Franieza), by virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated October 30, 2019.[22] When the case was due for pretrial conference, Sagun et al. filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings[23] claiming that Laqui’s Answer failed to deny the material allegations in their Complaint. In Laqui’s Comment on the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,[24] he argued that since he raised an affirmative defense, a judgment on the pleadings is improper because the said affirmative defense must still be tried.
The MTCC Ruling
The MTCC granted Sagun et al.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. In a Judgment[25] dated June 22, 2021, the MTCC held that Laqui is deemed to have admitted the material allegations[26] in Sagun et al.’s complaint by reason of his general assertion of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the said averments. The MTCC reasoned that although one of the modes of specific denial under the Rules of Court is a denial through a statement that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material averments in the complaint, if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed, or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform, or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made.[27] Anent the affirmative defense of Laqui that he cannot be ejected from the subject property since the property was already assigned to him by the alleged lawful owner, the MTCC held that the issue cannot be inquired upon anymore since it has been resolved with finality through the Amicable Settlement, which has the effect and authority of res judicata.[28] Further, the MTCC ruled that as a lessee, Laqui is not allowed to challenge the title of the lessor pursuant to Article 1436[29] of the Civil Code and Section 2(b) of Rule 131[30] of the Rules of Court.[31] Accordingly, Laqui was ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay Sagun et al. the rent of PHP 5,300.00 from September 2019 until he finally vacates the premises. Laqui’s Motion for Reconsideration[32] of the MTCC Judgment was denied in an Order[33] dated August 16, 2021.[34] Thus, he appealed to the RTC, the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 9467-R.[35] Laqui argued that the MTCC erred in not conducting a pretrial before rendering a judgment on the pleadings[36] and in denying his affirmative defense.[37]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[38] dated March 3, 2022, the RTC affirmed the MTCC Judgment. Anent the issue of the absence of a pretrial, the RTC ratiocinated that there is no rule which says that a judgment on the pleadings could not be rendered without a pretrial conference.[39] On the merits of the case, the RTC concurred with the MTCC’s pronouncement that in view of Laqui’s improper denial of the material allegations in Sagun et al.’s complaint, he is deemed to have admitted the same,[40] particularly the asseveration that Laqui failed to comply with the Amicable Settlement entered into before the Lupong Tagapamayapa. Further, the RTC did not consider Laqui’s affirmative defense that the subject property was assigned to him on the following grounds: (a) Laqui failed to attach his Judicial Affidavit in his Answer, which constitutes as a waiver of its submission pursuant to Section 10[41] of A.M. No 12-8-8-SC or the “Judicial Affidavit Rule” (Judicial Affidavit Rule);[42] (b) Laqui’s Judicial Affidavit, which was belatedly filed, is defective as the documentary exhibits were lacking and it did not contain a statement that “he is answering the questions asked of him, fully conscious that he does so under oath,” as required by Sections 2[43] and 3,[44] respectively, of the Judicial Affidavit Rule;[45] (c) Laqui failed to provide a valid justification in his “Motion to Admit Documentary Exhibits with Sincerest Apologies” to warrant the admission of the missing documentary exhibits;[46] and (d) even if the documentary exhibit, i.e., Deed of Assignment is to be admitted, Laqui is estopped from denying the title of the respondents pursuant to Article 1436 of the Civil Code and Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.[47] In an Order[48] dated May 11, 2002, the RTC denied Laqui’s Motion for Reconsideration. Unperturbed, he filed a Petition for Review[49] under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the CA, principally arguing that the RTC erred: (a) in ruling that a pretrial is not necessary before rendering a judgment on the pleadings;[50] and (b) in denying his affirmative defense.[51]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[52] dated November 13, 2023, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto. It affirmed the pronouncement of the RTC that there is no rule requiring the conduct of a pretrial conference before a judgment on the pleadings can be had.[53] Further, the CA ruled that the judgment on the pleadings was properly rendered since Laqui’s Answer failed to tender an issue for the reason that he is deemed to have admitted the material allegations in the Complaint of Sagun et al. owing to his failure to provide supporting arguments or evidence to substantiate his denial.[54] The CA also decreed that a denial for lack of knowledge of a thing that, by their nature, is ought to be known to the defendant is not an acceptable denial.[55] On the affirmative defense of Laqui, the CA likewise held that Laqui is estopped from questioning the title of Sagun et al. pursuant to Article 1436 of the Civil Code and Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.[56] Hence, this petition. Petitioner Rolly B. Laqui, Sr. argues that a pretrial conference should have been conducted first before a judgment on the pleadings can be rendered[57] and that he is not estopped from denying the title of respondents Sagun, et al.[58]
The Issues Before the Court
The issues for the Court’s resolution are: (a) whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision holding that the judgment on the pleadings was properly rendered even without a pretrial conference; and (b) whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC when the latter denied the affirmative defense of petitioner.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is without merit.
I.
At the outset, the Court finds it appropriate to hold that the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings by the MTCC in this case is improper. Nevertheless, the said judgment shall be considered as a summary judgment under Rule 35 as will be discussed hereunder. In Wood Technology Corporation v. Equitable Banking Corporation[59] and Iloilo Jar Corporation v. Comglasco Corporation/Aguila Glass[60] the Court corrected the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the trial courts and ruled that what the courts actually rendered was a summary judgment in view of the affirmative defense interposed by the defendants in the said cases. In so ruling, the Court in the two cases cited Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals[61] where the distinction between Judgment on the pleadings under Rule 34[62] and Summary Judgments under Rule 35[63] was explained:
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently exist — i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer — but the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. In other words, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proven by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.[64] (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, a genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.[65] In this case, the Answer of Laqui interposed an affirmative defense, i.e., that he cannot be ejected from the subject property since the property was already assigned to him by Franieza, the administrator of the Estate of Acopiado which, in turn, is the alleged lawful owner.[66] Thus, the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings is improper. What the MTCC should have rendered is a summary judgment because the affirmative defense of Laqui did not present a genuine issue which requires the presentation of evidence for the reason that he is estopped from denying the title of the respondents as lessors pursuant to Article 1436 of the Civil Code and Rule 131, Section 2(b) of the Rules of Court. Further, the right of respondents to recover possession of the property occupied by Laqui is no longer an issue as it has been resolved in the Amicable Settlement executed before the Barangay. An amicable settlement is in the nature of a compromise agreement which has the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved.[67]
II.
Anent the first issue, Laqui argues that a pretrial should have been first conducted before a judgment on the pleadings (or summary judgment as previously discussed) can be rendered. The Court finds the contention of Laqui untenable, whether viewed from the prism of judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In Spouses Pascual v. First Consolidated Rural Bank (Bohol) Inc.,[68] the Court repudiated the CA when the latter held that it is only at the pretrial that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment and clarified that then Rule 18, Section 2 (g)[69] of the Rules of Court only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has earlier been filed, the pretrial may be the occasion in which the court considers the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings. The import of this pronouncement is that a judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment may be rendered even without a pretrial. Moreover, while Rule 18 on Pre-Trial has provisions[70] dealing with judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments, Rule 34 and Rule 35 are still the legal bases for rendering the same,[71] being the ones that specifically deal with judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments. Nowhere in Rule 34 and Rule 35 is it stated that a judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment can be rendered only after pretrial. At any rate, the Court deems it proper to elucidate on the interplay between judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, and pretrial. A judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an answer to a claim fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations in the adverse party’s pleading. In this relation, an answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial under Rule 8, Sections 8[72] and 10,[73] of the Rules of Court, resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings.[74] The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether or not there are issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether issues of fact exist in a case or not depends on how the defending party’s answer has dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. If the defendant admits all the ultimate facts in the complaint, then such facts, being undisputed, will no longer require evidence.[75] Hence, upon proper motion, the court may be asked to render a judgment based on the pleadings. A trial in this case is dispensed with. As such, it is a form of judgment that is exclusively based on the submitted pleadings without the introduction of evidence as the factual issues remain uncontroverted.[76] On the other hand, a summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn-out litigations and useless delays.[77] It is aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation.[78] The reason for its existence is explained in Gorospe v. Santos:[79]
The purpose of Rule 34[80] of the Revised Rules is to eliminate trial in those cases where there is no genuine issue of fact, since a trial under such circumstances is unnecessary and results in delay and expense which may operate to defeat in whole or in part the recovery of a just claim. As explained by Moore, “The very object of a motion for summary judgment is to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial. To attain this end, the rule permits a party to pierce the allegations of fact in the pleadings and to obtain relief by summary judgment where facts set forth in detail in affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file show that there are no genuine issues of facts to be tried. The court is authorized to examine evidence, not for the purpose of trying an issue, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact proper for trial."[81]
Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits. Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[82] The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defenses offered constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised not genuine so as to justify a summary judgment?[83] From the foregoing disquisition, it can be deduced that both judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments are tools in the realm of adjective law, the raison d’être of which is to allow the immediate disposition of cases by dispensing with the need of trial when the requisites for their utilization are present. Relatedly, pretrial is a procedural device meant to limit the issues to be tackled and proved at the trial.[84] It is primarily intended to make certain that all issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised.[85] Its chief objective is the simplification, abbreviation, and expedition, if not the dispensation, of trial[86] by filtering issues that need to be considered. An issue arises if there is an antagonistic assertion by the opposing parties of their respective claims as a result of a denial by one party of the allegations of the other. Thus, if there are no issues owing to the admission of one party of the material allegations of the other or that the issues raised are not genuine thereby dispensing with the need of a trial, and the court can render a judgment on the basis of the allegations and admissions in the case of a judgment on the pleadings or on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits and/or counter-affidavits[87] in the case of a summary judgment, then the conduct of a pretrial is no longer necessary as there are no longer issues to be tried. If the answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, or does not raise a genuine issue, then a court can render a judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 34 or summary judgment pursuant to Rule 35, as the case may be, even before and without pretrial since a pretrial in this circumstance would be devoid of any practical significance as there would no longer be issues to be tried by virtue of the admission or the fact that the issues raised are either sham, fictitious, contrived, or set up in bad faith and are patently unsubstantial. If, notwithstanding the failure of the answer to tender an issue or that the issues raised are not genuine, the case reached the pretrial stage, then the court can issue a judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment after the pretrial pursuant to Rule 18, Section 10.[88] Laqui’s postulation that a judgment on the pleadings (or summary judgment) is predicated on the conduct of pretrial is tantamount to needlessly protracting litigation and is antithetical to the reason for which the devices of judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments exist. To indulge Laqui’s contention is to emaciate the potency of these remedial tools in promoting the objective of the Rules of Court in securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.[89]
III.
On the issue of the denial of Laqui’s affirmative defense, he argues that he is not estopped from raising the issue of ownership since there was a change in the nature of the title of respondents. He alleged that this claimed change of nature of the title of respondents was only made known to him only after the signing of the amicable settlement which he was forced to sign.[90] This issue cannot be given due course as it is a question of fact. Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[91] None of the exceptions[92] which warrant a factual review is present in this case. Nevertheless, Laqui’s contention is still unmeritorious. Laqui cites the case of Santos v. National Statistics Office[93] to buttress his position:
[W]hat a tenant is estopped from denying . . . is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord’s title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. Thus, we declared in Borre v. Court of Appeals that:
The rule on estoppel against tenants is subject to a qualification. It does not apply if the landlord’s title has expired, or has been conveyed to another, or has been defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee relationship. In other words, if there was a change in the nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of the lease, then the presumption does not apply. Otherwise, if the nature of the landlord’s title remains as it was during the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant, then estoppel lies against the tenant.[94]
The pronouncement in Santos is not applicable in this case. There is no change in the nature of the title of respondents subsequent to the commencement of the lessor-lessee relationship. Laqui argues that the subject property was owned by the late Don Gregorio and Don Anacleto M. Acopiado (Acopiado) as early as 1972,[95] long before the commencement of the lessor-lessee relationship between him and respondents in 2002. This claim is essentially a denial of respondents’ title at the time of the commencement of the lessor-lessee relationship between them, a situation that is squarely addressed by Rule 132, Section 2(b) of the Rules of Court and Article 1436 of the Civil Code. To give a mirage of such a subsequent change, Laqui cites the purported Deed of Assignment allegedly executed on October 30, 2019 between the claimed administrator of the property, Franieza, and him. However, as found by the RTC, Laqui failed to prove the authenticity of the said Deed of Assignment.[96] He also failed to establish the authority of Franieza to make an assignment of the subject property.[97] Tangentially, it is well to note that an administrator’s power extends only to acts of administration, i.e., those acts aimed at managing and preserving the property of the deceased.[98] In order to perform acts of strict dominion such as an assignment, an administrator needs an authorization from the probate court which has jurisdiction over the estate.[99] In this case, while court proceedings or orders have been cited in the Deed of Assignment, no authentic copies were presented.[100] Assuming arguendo that the Deed of Assignment and the court orders were duly established, the Deed of Assignment is not constitutive of a change of title subsequent to the commencement of the lessor-lessee relationship between Laqui and the respondents for the reason that it proceeds from the alleged title of the Acopiados which cannot be invoked to deny the title of the respondents since Laqui is estopped as afore-discussed. ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. Petitioner Rolly B. Laqui, Sr. is ORDERED to vacate the leased property at No. 54 Manuel Roxas Street, Teacher’s Camp, Baguio City and to PAY respondents Alex E. Sagun, Nelia S. Espiritu, and Katherine Marie T. Sagun PHP 5,300.00 from September 2019 until such time when Laqui, Sr. shall have finally vacated the same. The amount awarded shall bear legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until full payment as the interim period constitutes a forbearance of credit.[101] SO ORDERED. Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.