[ G.R. No. 246787. January 30, 2024 ] 950 Phil. 644
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 246787. January 30, 2024 ]
SPOUSES ENRIQUE LLONILLO AND MARITES LLONILLO, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
ROSARIO, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] (Petition) on certiorari of the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC affirmed the Decision[5] of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which found petitioners, spouses Enrique Llonillo (Enrique) and Marites Llonillo (Marites; collectively, spouses Llonillo), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Other Deceits defined and penalized under Article 318, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
Spouses Llonillo were charged with the crime of Estafa under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (Other Deceits) before the MeTC in an Information[6] dated December 17, 2012, which reads:
On the 30th day of March 2009, in the city of Makati, [] Philippines, accused[,] conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainant Pedro Joel V. Caspillo in the following manner; accused by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representations they made to complainant to the effect that Unit H[,] at No. 236 Aguho St., was free from any encumbrances whatsoever and that by way of interest for loan extended, complainant is entitled to collect the rental directly from the occupants of the said unit, which representation they know for a fact to be false considering that the unit is already encumbered in violation of the Deed of Mortgage they executed, and that the rental cannot be collected as the occupant has previously entered into a similar agreement with accused and there appears to be no other reason but only to convince the complainant to part with his [PHP] 300,000.00 and in fact complainant delivered the amount to the accused, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Upon arraignment, spouses Llonillo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[8]
Pre-trial was conducted and thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.[9]
The facts, according to the prosecution,[10] are as follows:
Sometime in March 2009, spouses Llonillo approached private complainant Pedro Joel Caspillo (Caspillo) through Grace Pangan (Grace), their purported agent, and offered Caspillo a sangla-tira arrangement on several units of the two buildings they own located at 236 Aguho Street, Barangay Comembo, Makati City. Spouses Llonillo explained that they were looking for persons who could lend them money for a fixed period. They would enter into a written contract with the lender, and in consideration, the lender will be entitled to the rent of the apartment unit as interest, in the amount of PHP 10,000.00 per month. The loan will be paid in full at the end of the period agreed upon.[11]
Spouses Llonillo assured Caspillo that the buildings and lots where the apartment units were built had no prior liens or encumbrances and showed him the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) covering the said properties.[12]
Enticed with spouses Llonillo’s offer and assured that the properties were unencumbered, Caspillo lent them PHP 300,000.00 on March 30, 2009. Caspillo chose apartment unit H, which was unoccupied at that time. Simultaneously, Caspillo and spouses Llonillo executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), where spouses Llonillo acknowledged receipt of the money, to be paid on or before March 20, 2010. The agreement as to the interest of PHP 10,000.00 per month was not indicated in the MOA since Caspillo himself occupied the unit.[13]
After 10 days, Caspillo put up unit H for rent and leased it to a friend, who only occupied it for a month. Caspillo then decided to use the unit by putting up a mini store, but it turned out to be unprofitable. Marites offered to find a lessee for unit H and assured Caspillo about the payment of the PHP 10,000.00 monthly rental.[14]
Unit H was thereafter occupied, but Caspillo failed to collect the monthly rentals thereon. Caspillo investigated the property and discovered that spouses Llonillo and the occupants of unit H, Germalyn Josol (Josol) and Rodrigo Arevalo, Jr. (Arevalo, Jr.), also entered into a sangla-tira arrangement over the same unit. Upon verification with the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, Caspillo also discovered that the properties involved in the sangla-tira arrangement were mortgaged to different banks, contrary to spouses Llonillo’s representation during the negotiation.[15]
The period agreed upon in the MOA for the payment of the PHP 300,000.00 lapsed without any payment from the spouses Llonillo. Thus, Caspillo filed a complaint against spouses Llonillo for estafa under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.[16]
Spouses Llonillo denied the charges against them and interposed the following narrative[17] in their defense:
Marites inherited two 4-storey buildings consisting of several apartment units located at 236 Aguho Street, Barangay Comembo, Makati City (subject property). In constructing the buildings thereon, she mortgaged the subject property to different financial institutions and rented out the apartment units in the two buildings. The rentals from the apartment units were used to amortize the loans from the banks. Their agent, Grace, proposed a sangla-tira arrangement, whereby Grace would look for persons who could lend money to spouses Llonillo for a fixed period of time, and, in return, the lenders would occupy the apartment units and be entitled to the rental payment of the same as interest. One of the lenders referred by Grace is Caspillo.[18]
Marites alleged that she never met Caspillo, as it was Grace who brokered the entire transaction, including the preparation of the MOA. Marites claimed that when Grace presented the MOA to them, it was undated and incomplete. Marites also claimed that of the PHP 300,000.00 loan from Caspillo, she only received PHP 285,000.00 through Grace.[19]
Marites alleged that when she and Enrique encountered business reverses, especially when they were directly affected by typhoon Ondoy, PS Bank instituted foreclosure proceedings over the subject property. When the subject property was foreclosed, the bank notified the occupants/lessees that when the redemption period expires, the bank would dispossess them through court action. This caused the lessees to panic, some left the apartment units while others resorted to filing cases against them. Marites then stated that they were able to redeem the property sometime in March 2012.[20]
For his part, Enrique admitted that Caspillo extended to them a PHP 300,000.00 loan, but denied that he and Marites represented that their property was free from liens and encumbrances. He insisted that the transaction between them and Caspillo was a simple loan and that Marites only transacted with Grace, not directly with Caspillo. He claimed to have met Caspillo only when the latter became a tenant in the subject property.[21]
While the case was pending before the MeTC, spouses Llonillo filed a Manifestation[22] with a prayer for the dismissal of the case. They stated that since the Information in the instant case did not bear the approval of the chief prosecutor of Makati City or its deputy state prosecutor, the same is invalid and in gross violation of Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3[23] of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In an Order[24] dated August 4, 2015, the MeTC denied spouses Llonillo’s prayer.
Ruling of the MeTC
In a Decision dated December 9, 2015, the MeTC found spouses Llonillo guilty of the crime charged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, ENRIQUE P. LLONILLO and MARITES LLONILLO y BITENG, guilty of the crime of Other Deceits defined and penalized under Art. 318, 1st par[.] of the Revised Penal Code and the said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer six (6) months imprisonment and to [pay] a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos ([PHP] 300,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay within fifteen days from notice.
Accused are ordered to pay complainant in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos ([PHP] 300,000.00) as actual damages plus 6% interest per annum from April 10, 2013 until the debt shall have been paid in full and the amount of [PHP] 30,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.[25] (Emphasis in the original)
The MeTC found that the prosecution clearly established the fraudulent representation of spouses Llonillo since they subjected unit H to a sangla-tira arrangement with other individuals, despite their arrangement with Caspillo. Spouses Llonillo then misrepresented to Caspillo that he was entitled to the rentals of unit H as interest for the loan they obtained from him, which representation they knew to be false as unit H was also mortgaged to other individuals who eventually occupied the unit. The MeTC further found that such misrepresentation was designed to convince Caspillo to part with his money. No rent for unit H or interest for the money was given to Caspillo, and neither was the PHP 300,000.00 returned to him.[26]
The MeTC also held that spouses Llonillo intended to defraud Caspillo from the start, as only Enrique signed the MOA while Marites received the money. Enrique even admitted that Marites brought him the MOA for his signature after Marites received the PHP 300,000.00. For the MeTC, there appears to be a unity of purpose between spouses Llonillo, as it was clear that they agreed to offer a sangla-tira arrangement to different individuals for the same apartment unit and agreed on the execution of the MOA.[27]
The MeTC also found that there was a suppression of material fact, which spouses Llonillo were bound in good faith to disclose, when they rented out unit H to Arevalo, Jr.[28]
As regards spouses Llonillo’s civil liability, the MeTC stated that the civil aspect of the case is deemed instituted with the criminal case, pursuant to Article 2201 of the Civil Code. Since spouses Llonillo admitted receiving PHP 300,000.00 from Caspillo, this amount should be returned with lawful interest from the time the case was filed in court, or on April 10, 2013.[29]
Aggrieved, spouses Llonillo appealed before the RTC.
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC affirmed the MeTC in a Decision dated April 27, 2016, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no reversible error in the assailed December 9, 2015 Decision of the court a quo, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[30] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
The RTC found that spouses Llonillo did not present evidence to prove that they disclosed to Caspillo the fact of the mortgages with the bank when they entered into a sangla-tira arrangement. According to the RTC, such act constitutes false or fraudulent misrepresentation made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, and as a result, Caspillo suffered damage or prejudice.[31]
The RTC further held that the elements of deceit and damage are present in this case, as when spouses Llonillo transacted with Caspillo with respect to the sangla-tira of unit H, spouses Llonillo did not disclose the previous mortgages to other persons and banks. Such undisclosed fact is material to Caspillo’s decision whether to part with his money.[32]
Spouses Llonillo filed a Motion for Reconsideration[33] which the RTC denied in an Order[34] dated June 27, 2016.
Undaunted, spouses Llonillo filed a Petition for Review[35] before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
The CA likewise affirmed the RTC in a Decision dated July 30, 2018. The fallo of which reads:
FOR THESE REASONS, the instant Petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and the appealed Decision dated 27 April 2016 and Order dated 27 June 2016 rendered by Branch 133 of the National Capital Judicial Region of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Criminal Case No. 16-003 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[36] (Emphasis in the original)
According to the CA, “[t]he false or fraudulent representation by petitioners that the apartment unit is free from any encumbrance, when in fact said property was already covered by a previous mortgage, and that they, in fact employed such fraudulent act to obtain Three Hundred Thousand Pesos ([PHP] 300,000.00) from complainant Caspillo, is one of those deceitful acts envisaged in paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code."[37]
The CA found that spouses Llonillo’s fraudulent representation was clearly established when they made it appear that Caspillo could collect the rentals of unit H as interest for the loan they obtained from him, which representation they knew to be false as they mortgaged the unit to different banks and entered into a sangla-tira arrangement over the same unit with other people. It was based on the representation that unit H is free from encumbrance that Caspillo was convinced to part with his money. Spouses Llonillo’s failure to disclose to Caspillo the previous mortgages involving unit H constitutes false or fraudulent misrepresentation, made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. Consequently, Caspillo suffered damage or prejudice.[38]
Spouses Llonillo filed a Motion for Reconsideration[39] which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 15, 2019.
Hence, this Petition.
The Issues
In their Petition, spouses Llonillo claim that the CA erred in issuing the assailed Decision and Resolution for the following reasons:
The criminal case against spouses Llonillo should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused due to a void Information filed in court. The Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr. does not contain the written authority of the chief prosecutor and/or the deputy prosecutors, in violation of Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and as directed in Quisay v. People.[40]
(a) The alleged “failure to disclose material information” in Article 1339[41] of the Civil Code cannot apply under loan agreement involving possession or “sangla-tira” since Caspillo possessed the subject premises for two years and used it as a siomai and rice store. This case was, thus, used to collect the amount of the loan and was purposely filed to avoid payment of filing fees.
(b) The CA also falsely pronounced that Caspillo failed to possess the subject premises, when in truth, the latter was able to use the subject premises for two years, as proven by Caspillo’s testimony.
Spouses Llonillo cannot be convicted: (a) for a future act or event, which transpired two years from the execution of the MOA; (b) based on allegations not stated in the Information, thus, violating their right to due process; and (c) based on a simple loan, which is not a crime.[42]
Spouses Llonillo’s issues can be summed up into two:
Whether the MeTC had jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the case due to a purportedly defective and void Information.
Whether spouses Llonillo are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Other Deceits punishable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious. While the MeTC had jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the case, spouses Llonillo cannot be convicted of the crime charged.
At the outset, spouses Llonillo’s arguments require the Court to examine the facts anew, which is beyond the ambit of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The determination of guilt is a question of fact, not entertained in a petition for review under Rule 45. Time and again, jurisprudence has established that the Court is not a trier of facts. Indeed, ordinarily, a petition for review on certiorari is limited only to questions of law.[43]
Nonetheless, under exceptional circumstances, this Court admits and reviews questions of fact under Rule 45, which exceptions include: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the finding of fact of the CA is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.[44] The Court finds that the fourth exception applies to the case.
The Information herein sufficiently conferred upon the MeTC the authority to hear, try, and decide the case
Spouses Llonillo rely on Quisay in arguing that the criminal case against them should have been dismissed due to the lack of written authority of the chief prosecutor and/or deputy prosecutors in the Information.
Spouses Llonillo’s argument is without merit. The doctrine in Quisay was abandoned by the Court in Gomez v. People,[45] as follows:
All told, the handling prosecutor’s authority, particularly as it does not appear on the face of the Information, has no connection to the trial court’s power to hear and decide a case. Hence, Sec. [3(d)], Rule 117, requiring a handling prosecutor to secure a prior written authority or approval from the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor before filing an Information with the courts, may be waived by the accused through silence, acquiescence, or failure to raise such ground during arraignment or before entering a plea. If, at all, such deficiency is merely formal and can be cured at any stage of the proceedings in a criminal case.
Moreover, both the State and the accused are entitled to the constitutional guarantee of due process — especially when the most contentious of issues involve jurisdictional matters. A denial of such guarantee against any of the parties of the case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, a judgment of acquittal or order of dismissal amounting to an acquittal which is tainted with grave abuse of discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a first jeopardy.
Henceforth, all previous doctrines laid down by this Court, holding that the lack of signature and approval of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor on the face of the Information shall divest the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter in a criminal action, are hereby abandoned. It is sufficient for the validity of the Information or Complaint, as the case may be, that the Resolution of the investigating prosecutor recommending for the filing of the same in court bears the imprimatur of the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor whose approval is required by Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 5180 and is adopted under Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.[46]
Accordingly, the MeTC had jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the instant case.
Spouses Llonillo are not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
The RTC and the CA found spouses Llonillo guilty of the crime of Other Deceits under Article 318, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
ARTICLE 318. Other deceits. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mention in the preceding articles of this chapter.
In Osorio v. People,[47] We reiterated that Article 318 is broad in application and is intended as a catch-all provision to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code.[48] For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318, the following elements must exist:
(a) [The accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in [Articles 315, 316, and 317]; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.[49]
In Marcos v. People,[50] the Court elaborated on the definitions of “false pretense” and “fraudulent concealment”:
Specifically, false pretense is an intentional false statement concerning a material matter of fact. False pretense may be established by conduct and acts, as well as by words, written or spoken.
On the other hand, for concealment to be fraudulent, the purpose or design of which is to hide facts the other party ought to know. “Failure to reveal a fact [that] the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may generally be classified as a deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to deceive. Suppression of a material fact [that] a party is bound, in good faith, to disclose is equivalent to a false representation.”
In Guinhawa v. People . . . , the Court had the occasion to illustrate what constitutes fraudulent concealment punishable as Other Deceits under Article 318 (1) of the RPC. In the said case, Guinhawa was a dealer of brand new cars in Naga City. He purchased a brand new L-300 van from the Union Motors Corporation in Manila to be resold in his office and display room in Naga City. However, on the way to Naga City, the van met an accident that caused it to be repaired for damages. Nevertheless, Guinhawa displayed the van in its show room, making it appear to the public that it was brand new. When complainants bought the van, Guinhawa never revealed that the same was defective. The complainants, within a few days after the sale of the van, soon discovered its defects. The Court held that Guinhawa’s deliberate concealment of the van’s defects is fraudulent because as the seller, he had the duty to disclose materials [sic] facts, such as the real condition of the van.[51] (Citations omitted)
It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to part with their property.[52]
In claiming that spouses Llonillo are guilty of violation of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution posited that spouses Llonillo did not disclose the material fact that the subject property was mortgaged to banks and to other persons. Such nondisclosure allegedly led Caspillo to believe that he would be entitled to the rentals of unit H. This misrepresentation prodded Caspillo into entering an agreement with spouses Llonillo and parting with the amount of PHP 300,000.00.
However, contrary to Caspillo’s avowal in his Complaint-Affidavit,[53] his testimony evinces that when he entered into an agreement with spouses Llonillo, he already knew that the subject property was already mortgaged to banks. Caspillo testified:
Q
And isn’t it a fact, Mr. Witness, that you even testified, that according to you, before you entered into a loan agreement the accused presented to you the copy of certificate of title, correct?
A
Yes, sir.
. . . .
Q
And what were presented to you are two separate copies of certificate of titles, correct?
A
Yes, sir.
. . . .
Q
Which were presented to you before entering into a loan agreement, isn’t it a fact, at the dorsal portion of the last page thereof on both titles, there is already an entry that the property is already [] mortgaged to a financial institution?
A
Yes.
. . . .
Q
And, of course, Mr. Witness, you examined these titles, correct?
A
Yes, I saw that, sir.[54]
. . . .
Q
Did it not occur to your mind that the accused cannot present you the original of these titles, because it is in the possession of the bank where it is mortgaged, correct?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
You know that fact?
A
Yes, sir.
. . . .
Q
Because when they executed [the mortgage] contract with the bank, they are required to surrender the possession of the original of these certificates of titles, correct?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Are you aware of that?
A
Yes, sir.[55]
Caspillo’s categorical and unequivocal admission carries weight and conviction when juxtaposed with his subsequent assertion that “he was shown photocopies of the TCT and OCT covering the lots where the buildings were located, but he did not read the annotations anymore because they were negotiating hurriedly."[56]
Judicial admissions made by parties during trial in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them.[57] “They are legally binding on the party making them except when it is shown that they have been made through palpable mistake, or that no such admission was made,"[58] neither of which exists in this case.
Therefore, there is no suppression of a material fact anent the real estate being mortgaged to banks at the time of the execution of the MOA. Even the MeTC did not anchor its finding of the purported fraudulent representation on spouses Llonillo’s supposed nondisclosure of previous mortgage to banks. Rather, the MeTC found that the misrepresentation was spouses Llonillo’s act of making unit H the subject of the sangla-tira scheme to other persons.[59]
However, neither can the sangla-tira scheme regarding unit H entered into by spouses Llonillo with other persons be considered as being “made prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.” When spouses Llonillo and Caspillo executed the MOA in 2009, unit H was not covered by any sangla-tira to any person except Caspillo. It was only after, i.e., in 2011 and 2012, that spouses Llonillo entered into sangla-tira arrangements with Arevalo, Jr. and Josol, respectively.[60]
Hence, there can be no misrepresentation at the time of the MOA’s execution. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove that there was a false pretense and that such false pretense was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
As mentioned, there are three elements of the crime of Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in [Articles 315, 316, and 317]; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. In this case, the first and second elements do not exist as there was no false pretense. However, the element of damage still exists: there is no proof that spouses Llonillo have paid Caspillo the full amount of their PHP 300,000.00 loan. There is still an act from which civil liability might arise: the act of loaning PHP 300,000.00 and not timely paying it back despite demand.
Accordingly, the prosecution failed to prove spouses Llonillo’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Spouses Llonillo’s civil liability
Records reveal that Caspillo still suffered damage due to spouses Llonillo’s act of borrowing the amount of PHP 300,000.00 without paying him back on the date agreed upon. Spouses Llonillo’s act of borrowing PHP 300,000.00 is evidenced by the MOA (a contract) and the testimonies of Caspillo and spouses Llonillo.
Considering the foregoing, may spouses Llonillo be adjudged liable in this action for the PHP 300,000.00 loan despite their acquittal due to failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt? Stated differently, in case of acquittal of an accused, may civil liability arising from sources other than the offense charged be adjudged in the same criminal action?
Article 29 of the Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Corollary to Article 29 of the Civil Code is Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 100. Civil Liability of a Person Guilty of Felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Civil liability arising from crimes are governed by penal laws, subject to Articles 29 to 35, 2176, 2177, and 2202, 2204, 2206, 2215, 2230, 2233, and 2234 of the Civil Code and to Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.[61]
The last paragraph of Rule 111, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 2. When separate civil action is suspended. —
. . . .
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
In De Guzman v. Alvia,[62] the Court held:
The acquittal of Magdalena in Criminal Case No. 8776 was not due to her guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt but because there being no misappropriation or conversion or bad faith, the crime charged was not committed. What in [Our] opinion is applicable is Rule 107, section 1, paragraph (d) of the Rules of Court which reads thus:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered[.]
Inasmuch as the final judgment in Criminal Case No. 8776 against Magdalena does not contain any declaration that the fact from which civil liability might arise did not exist but on the contrary, it found that she received the jewelry and it intimated that her responsibility was civil rather than criminal, then the civil action was not extinguished.[63]
Rule 120, Section 2 of the said Rules also provides:
SECTION 2. Contents of the Judgment. — If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Emphasis supplied)
It must be emphasized that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not prohibit the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. Rule 120, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, as quoted above, recognizes this as well, hence, the directive that the “judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.”
In Padilla v. Court of Appeals,[64] the Court stressed that Article 29 allows courts to adjudge civil liability in the same criminal case where the judgment of acquittal was pronounced.
Since Padilla is an En Banc decision, subsequent decisions holding otherwise, rendered by the Court in division, cannot overturn Padilla. Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution is instructive:
[N]o doctrine or principle of law laid down by the (Supreme) Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.[65]
Therefore, it behooves the Court to rely on the doctrine in Padilla, i.e., that courts may adjudge civil liability in the same criminal case where the judgment of acquittal was pronounced.
From the foregoing doctrine, the Court explained in De Leon, Jr. v. Roqson Industrial Sales, Inc.[66] that “[w]ith criminal absolution, Article 29 contemplates an ‘act or omission’ from which liability may arise based on the other sources of obligations which are independent of the delict."[67] These other sources of obligation are those enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code: law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts.
Hence, the following ruling in Padilla:
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt. . . as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature. . . as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted[.][68] (Citations omitted)
The ruling in Padilla, which is reiterated in later cases, presumes that the surviving civil liability is sourced from an obligation other than the criminal charge. Thus, it can be deduced that a single act or omission can give rise to civil liability premised on a legal provision, a contractual or quasi contractual obligation, a quasi-delict, and/or the commission of a criminal offense. These are exemplified in the following cases:
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals,[69] the petitioner was charged with estafa after using checks, which were later dishonored, to pay for groceries. Although the petitioner was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence, she was adjudged civilly liable for the unpaid value of the checks as the facts established by the evidence therein so warrant. The petitioner’s liability for the unpaid value of the checks was based on contract.
In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,[70] the petitioner was acquitted on reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Nonetheless, he was held civilly liable for loss of support, moral damages, and death indemnity due to his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident resulting in the victim’s death. The petitioner’s civil liability was based on quasi-delict.
In Lumantas v. Spouses Calapiz, Jr.,[71] the petitioner was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries after his operation on a patient caused a damaged urethra. The petitioner was acquitted as the prosecution failed to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty. However, there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable. Hence, the petitioner was held liable to the victim for moral damages. The petitioner’s civil liability in this case was also based on quasi-delict.
In Chiok v. People,[72] the petitioner was acquitted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code as the allegation of misappropriation of private complainant’s money was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Nonetheless, the petitioner was held civilly liable as the monetary transaction between petitioner and private complainant and the amount given to petitioner, were shown by preponderance of evidence. The petitioner’s civil liability was based on contract.
In Horca v. People,[73] the petitioner was charged with the crime of theft for failure to return the money given to her to purchase airline tickets despite the flight’s cancellation. The petitioner was acquitted on reasonable doubt for the prosecution’s failure to sufficiently prove the element of taking with intent to gain. However, she was held civilly liable as there was preponderant evidence to establish her liability. Private complainants therein were still prejudiced when they paid for the tickets but did not get reimbursed when the flight was cancelled. The petitioner’s civil liability was based on contract.
It was also observed in De Leon, Jr. that in cases where civil liability survives despite an acquittal based on reasonable doubt, “the underlying transactions or events that gave rise to the damage sustained by the complaining party, at the very least, ascribed responsibility or benefit on the part of the acquitted, thereby justifying a finding of civil liability."[74]
It bears reiterating that Rule 120, Section 2 of the Rules of Court states that “[i]n case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove [their] guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.”
It is also established that acquittal in a criminal case does not bar continuation of the civil case connected therewith where: (1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (2) the decision contains a declaration that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil; or (3) the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.[75]
Law and jurisprudence have therefore recognized the existence of civil liability not derived from the crime despite an accused’s acquittal, and that the civil action to enforce that civil liability can be made in the same criminal action.
Hence, despite the limitation in Rule 111, Section 1(a)[76] of the Rules of Court, the civil liability from sources other than the delict may be adjudged in the same criminal action, if the act or omission complained of in the criminal action is the same or is related to the act or omission giving rise to the civil liability. And this can be done without violation of the right to due process.
Assuming the offended party does not waive the civil action, does not reserve the right to institute it separately, or does not institute the civil action prior to the criminal action, the accused is presumed to know that their civil liability from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action, as stated in Rule 111, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Interpreting Rule 111, Section 1 of the Rules of Court with the Revised Penal Code provisions on what is included in civil liability and how it is extinguished,[77] the accused should already present all defenses available to them to also defend themself against restitution of the thing itself, reparation for the alleged damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages.
If the act or omission complained of in the criminal action is the same or is related to the act or omission giving rise to the civil liability arising from sources other than the delict, the accused should already be prepared to defend themselves against civil liability arising from these other sources. They cannot claim that they were deprived of due process if based on this single act or omission, they are acquitted but are made civilly liable for the same act or omission.
In First Producers Holdings Corporation v. Co,[78] a case involving a criminal action for estafa, the Court held that the accused may invoke all defenses pertaining to their civil liability in the criminal action:
We find no sufficient reason why the trial court hearing the criminal case cannot resolve the question of ownership. Significantly, the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal action. Hence, respondent may invoke all defenses pertaining to [their] civil liability in the criminal action. In fact, there is no law or rule prohibiting [them] from airing exhaustively the question of ownership. After all, the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the said defense. The rules of evidence and procedure for the recovery of civil liabilities are the same in both criminal and civil cases.[79] (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing rule was reiterated in Sabandal v. Tongco,[80] which involves an accused’s claim of overpayment raised in a civil action. The Court therein held:
Petitioner’s claim of overpayment to respondent may be raised as a defense during the trial of the cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 charged against him. The civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal action. Hence, petitioner may invoke all defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal action.[81]
In Salazar v. People,[82] the Court pronounced that in a criminal action, the prosecution presents evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. The offended party or the accused may even appeal the civil aspect of the case should the accused be acquitted but be found civilly liable:
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former.
. . . .
The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case.
. . . .
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.[83]
It is the accused’s duty to still defend themself against this civil liability since, as mentioned, the act or omission complained of in the criminal action may be the same or may be related to the act or omission giving rise to the civil liability arising from sources other than the delict.
Civil liability can, thus, be adjudged in a criminal case, regardless of the legal source of the obligation, while still complying with the requirements of due process. However, the civil liability which can be adjudged in criminal proceedings must be related to the same act or omission complained of in the criminal charge, but it need not be legally sourced from the commission of the criminal offense. When the civil liability of the accused arising from a source of obligation other than the crime, such as law, contract, quasi-contract, or quasi-delict, has already been established by a preponderance of evidence, it can be imposed in the same criminal proceeding.
For uniformity, there is a need to come up with parameters for the award of civil liability based on sources other than the delict. Thus:
The award of civil liability based on sources other than the delict can be made in the same criminal action, subject to the following conditions: (1) the act or omission complained of in the criminal action is the same or is related to the act or omission giving rise to the civil liability; (2) the civil liability of the accused was raised in the criminal action; (3) the accused was given the opportunity to be heard on this point; and (4) the civil liability of the accused was established by a preponderance of evidence.
As applied in this case, the other source of obligation on which spouses Llonillo’s civil liability is based in contract, i.e., the MOA they entered into with Caspillo.
The acts complained of in the criminal action are the alleged nondisclosure of mortgages over the properties rented by Caspillo and execution of sangla-tira arrangements with other persons, allegedly depriving Caspillo of the rentals promised to him pursuant to the MOA with spouses Llonillo. These acts were allegedly done to enable spouses Llonillo to borrow PHP 300,000.00 from Caspillo. The nonpayment of the PHP 300,000.00 loan is the damage caused to Caspillo. It cannot therefore be denied that the loan to spouses Llonillo is related to the acts complained of in the criminal action. Hence, the first condition is complied with.
The second and third conditions were also complied with. Records show that spouses Llonillo’s civil liability, i.e., their PHP 300,000.00 debt to Caspillo, was raised in the criminal action. As the MeTC found: spouses Llonillo admitted the loan, and when asked if she ever paid the principal loan, Marites alleged she did but admitted she has no documentary proof.[84]
Spouses Llonillo’s allegation of payment is a mere allegation, without substantiation. They had every opportunity to prove payment, especially since the MeTC ordered them to pay Caspillo the amount of PHP 300,000.00 as actual damages until the debt shall have been paid in full.[85] However, spouses Llonillo never submitted proof of payment of the loan, even partial payment thereof. It is for this reason that the MeTC adjudged spouses Llonillo civilly liable to Caspillo for PHP 300,000.00 as actual damages.
Since spouses Llonillo admitted but failed to present evidence of any payment, the evidence tilts in favor of Caspillo. Hence, the fourth condition was also complied with: there is preponderance of evidence showing that spouses Llonillo are still liable to Caspillo for PHP 300,000.00.
Thus, spouses Llonillo should be adjudged civilly liable to Caspillo for the full amount of the loan, with interest of 12% per annum from the time of the filing of the case in court (i.e., April 10, 2013[86]) until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this Decision. The total amount due shall earn interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment.[87]
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED. The July 30, 2018 Decision and the April 15, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 38855 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners spouses Enrique and Marites Llonillo are ACQUITTED of the crime of Other Deceits under the first paragraph of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners spouses Enrique and Marites Llonillo are liable to pay private complainant Pedro Joel Caspillo the principal amount of PHP 300,000.00, plus legal interest of 12% per annum from April 10, 2013 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this Decision. The total amount due shall earn interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Zalameda and Marquez, JJ., concur. Gesmundo, C.J., please see concurring opinion. Leonen, SAJ., dissent and joined Justice Dimaampao. Caguioa and Hernando, JJ., see concurring opinion. Lazaro-Javier, J., see concurrence. Inting and M. Lopez, JJ., joined in the opinion of J. Dimaampao. Gaerlan, J., see dissenting opinion. J. Lopez, J., with separate opinion. Dimaampao, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion. Kho, Jr., J., joined the concurring and dissenting opinion of J. Dimaampao. Singh, J., see separate concurring opinion.