[ A.M. No. RTJ-24-075 [Formerly JIB FPI No. 22-135-RTJ]. October 29, 2024 ] 959 Phil. 935
EN BANC
[ A.M. No. RTJ-24-075 [Formerly JIB FPI No. 22-135-RTJ]. October 29, 2024 ]
ERNESTO CALLENA, JR., COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. CORPUS B. ALZATE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 2, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BANGUED, ABRA, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Case
Under a verified Affidavit-Complaint[1] dated May 18, 2021, complainant Ernesto Callena, Jr. (Callena) charged respondent Hon. Corpus B. Alzate (Judge Alzate), Presiding Judge, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Bangued, Abra with simple misconduct constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[2]
Antecedents
Callena claimed that from 2004 to 2021, Judge Alzate knowingly refused to pay his Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues. He asserts that said refusal cannot be excused simply because Judge Alzate is a judge. On the contrary, Judge Alzate should know the rules and his obligation to pay IBP dues.[3] According to Callena, Judge Alzate sees himself as “untouchable” because of his connections in the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Too, Judge Alzate is known for his “arrogance and self-centeredness,” but lawyers are hesitant to complain because of their pending cases in his sala.[4] In his Comment[5] dated May 26, 2022, Judge Alzate admitted that his name was not included in the list of qualified voters in the IBP chapter elections held on February 27, 2021. However, upon knowledge of Callena’s complaint, he immediately secured an assessment of his arrears. Thereafter, he paid PHP 23,100.00 to the IBP Central Office for his IBP dues from 2004 to 2021 as evidenced by the IBP receipt dated May 24, 2022.[6] Judge Alzate offered multiple reasons for his failure to pay his IBP dues. First. When he was a young lawyer, members of IBP Abra Chapter told him that one of the candidates in the IBP elections sponsored the payment of IBP dues for members of the chapter. Second. Whenever there were no “sponsors”, he would pay his IBP dues to the chapter. But there was a time the IBP Abra Chapter did not remit payments to the IBP Central Office. When the non-remittance was discovered, he was told that the payment records would be reconciled. As years passed by, no reconciliation of accounts was made which resulted in him forgetting about his IBP dues. Third. One Judge Conrado Venus of Regional Trial Court, Narvacan advised him that when a lawyer employed in the government service fails to pay his IBP dues, the arrears would automatically be deducted from his or her retirement pay or from his or her earned leaves. Judge Alzate merely relied on said advice in utmost “good faith."[7] Judge Alzate also pointed out that he never received any notice of delinquency or any resolution to suspend his member’s privileges from the IBP Central Office.[8] Lastly, Judge Alzate denied having strong connections to the OCA.[9] In his Reply[10] dated June 20, 2022, Callena disputed the “tall tales” of Judge Alzate. He asserted that Judge Alzate’s excuses were merely an attempt to justify his “deliberate [and] stubborn” refusal to pay IBP dues despite being a lawyer for 37 years and a judge for 22 years.[11] In any event, Judge Alzate admitted his non-payment of IBP dues. He also chided Judge Alzate for paying his dues only after receiving an administrative complaint.[12] More, Judge Alzate has been found guilty in the following administrative cases: (1) OCA IPI No. 03-1745-RTJ; (2) OCA IPI No. 15-4479-RTJ; and (3) A.M. No. RTJ-19-2574. Callena averred that the Supreme Court had been “very compassionate with [Judge Alzate]” despite his repeated acts of misconduct since the latter had only ever been admonished and fined.[13] Judge Alzate in his Rejoinder[14] dated July 4, 2022 surmised that Callena’s reply may have been authored by Atty. Maria Saniata Liwliwa Gonzales-Alzate (Atty. Gonzales-Alzate), counsel of Callena and wife of dismissed Judge Raphiel F. Alzate, a relative of his.[15] He alleged that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate had become “ballistic” since the dismissal of her husband from the Judiciary.[16] In a Letter[17] dated June 16, 2022, the Judicial Integrity Board – Office of the Executive Director (JIB-OED) directed Judge Alzate to submit a verified comment “concerning the administrative case against [him] as a member of the Philippine Bar."[18] It cited Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:
Section 4. Administrative Case Considered as Disciplinary Actions Against Members of the Philippine Bar. – An administrative case against any of those mentioned in Section 1(1) of this Rule shall also be considered as a disciplinary action against [them] as a member of the Philippine Bar, provided, that the complaint specifically states that the imputed acts or omissions therein likewise constitute a violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics, or such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In response, Judge Alzate filed his Manifestation[19] dated July 5, 2022 where he: (1) averred that the administrative case against him should be dismissed for violation of the rule against forum shopping; and (2) adopted the contents of his Comment and Rejoinder.[20]
Report and Recommendation of the JIB-OED
In his Report and Recommendation[21] dated March 29, 2023 Acting Executive Director James D.V. Navarette found Judge Alzate guilty of simple misconduct and violation of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Board that the instant administrative matter be REDOCKETED and the following recommendations be made to the Supreme Court:
Respondent Judge Corpus B. Alzate, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Bangued, Abra be found GUILTY of Simple Misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and FINED in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), payable within three (3) months from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated; and Respondent Judge Alzate be found LIABLE for violating Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and FINED in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), payable within three (3) months from the time the decision or resolution is promulgated.[22] (Emphasis in the original)
The JIB-OED held that sufficient grounds exist to hold Judge Alzate administratively liable.[23] He admitted failing to pay his IBP dues from 2004 to 2021, a period of 18 consecutive years.[24] Further, his excuses that his IBP dues were allegedly “sponsored” by an IBP chapter candidate and that another judge told him that his arrears would be deducted from his retirement and other monetary benefits, were untenable. As a judge, he should not have relied on another’s opinions and surmises. Good judges are those who have a mastery of the principles of law and discharge their duties in accordance with law. Thus, Judge Alzate should be held liable for simple misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[25] Considering that Judge Alzate had previously been found administratively liable for impropriety and gambling in public in RTJ-19-5974, a fine in the maximum amount of PHP 100,000.00 is warranted.[26] As for the administrative case against him as a lawyer, the JIB-OED held that Judge Alzate clearly violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."[27] Consequently, it recommended a fine in the amount of PHP 50,000.00.[28]
Report of the JIB
In its Report[29] dated July 30, 2024, the JIB adopted the findings of the JIB-OED but modified the recommended penalty for the simple misconduct charge. It noted that both Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as further amended by A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC and the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA)[30] consider the finding of previous administrative liability as an aggravating circumstance which allows the imposition of suspension or fine for a period or amount not exceeding double of the maximum prescribed.[31] As such, it increased the penalty for simple misconduct to PHP 150,000.00.[32]
Ruling
The Court resolves to adopt the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of the JIB in its Report dated July 30, 2024. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or “that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."[33] The burden of substantiating the charges in an administrative proceeding falls on the complainant, who must be able to prove the allegations in the complaint with substantial evidence.[34] Rule 139-A, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that all persons whose names appear or are included in the Roll of Attorneys compose an official body known as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.[35] Membership in the IBP is automatic and without exception.[36] Every member of the Integrated Bar is required to pay annual dues for the ensuing fiscal year on or before the 31st day of December, as may be extended by the IBP Board of Governors.[37] There is nothing in the law or rules which allows the exemption of any person—much more for members of the bench such as Judge Alzate—from payment of IBP dues.[38] Here, Judge Alzate admitted in his various submissions to the JIB that he failed to pay his IBP dues from 2004-2021.[39] He stated that:
Immediately after I received the instant complaint, I have undertaken steps to secure an assessment of my arrears and have PAID the IBP Central Office the amount of [PHP 23,100.00] corresponding to my dues from 2004-2021. . . Admittedly, I have arrears with the IBP (which I have NOW PAID) but the non-payment is a mental lapse. I was under the belief that the advice of a senior judge was true. I relied on this belief in utmost good faith. Thus, the non-payment cannot be considered as a stubborn or arrogant refusal to pay[.] Mr. Callena aver[s] that I only paid my delinquent dues when this complaint was filed. This is admitted. . . Admittedly, I have been remiss in my duty to pay my dues on time. . . . . . . To emphasize, the non-payment on my part was based on an honest belief; I may be mistaken in assuming that the dues will be paid with interest at the time of retirement but this mistake was done in good faith and not tainted with an evil scheme to defraud the IBP. (Emphasis supplied)
These statements are judicial admissions that require no further proof[40] and remove the admitted facts from the field of controversy.[41] Thus, Judge Alzate’s non-payment of IBP dues is beyond dispute. In any event, the record is replete with documentary evidence of Judge Alzate’s malfeasance. In a Letter[42] dated March 22, 2021, IBP National Treasurer Grace P. Quevedo-Panagsagan certified that “Alzate, Corpus B.” with Roll No. 33514 had “arrears in IBP Membership Dues” from 2004-2021. By Certification[43] dated May 20, 2022, Marnelli A. Acosta, Legal Aid Clerk of IBP Abra Chapter, attested that based on the records of IBP Abra Chapter and its List of Members with Delinquencies issued by the IBP National Office, Judge Alzate has not paid his IBP dues for a period of 18 years. Lastly, IBP Official Receipt No. 224392 dated May 24, 2022 submitted by Judge Alzate shows that his payment of PHP 23,100.00 was “Payment For M[embership] D[ues] 2004-2021."[44] The non-payment of IBP dues by a sitting member of the bench, no less, erodes public confidence in the judicial system in contravention of Canons 1, 2, and 4 the New Code of Judicial Conduct which provide:
CANON 1 Independence
. . . . SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
CANON2 Integrity
. . . . SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
CANON 4 Propriety
. . . . SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Clearly, Judge Alzate’s deliberate choice not to pay his IBP dues falls beyond the standard expected of members of the judiciary. His act is not only reproachable but also blatantly improper. The Court, therefore, finds him guilty of the less serious charge of simple misconduct constituting a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Under Section 17 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as further amended, a less serious charge may be punished as follows:
SECTION 17. Sanctions. —
. . . .
(2)
If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
(a)
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months; or
(b)
A fine of more than [PHP] 35,000.00 but not exceeding [PHP] 100,000.00.
Notably, Section 19 of the aforementioned Rule, authorizes the appreciation of modifying circumstances, viz.:
SECTION 19. Modifying Circumstances. – In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed, the Court may, in its discretion, appreciate the following mitigating and aggravating circumstances:
. . . .
(2)
Aggravating Circumstances:
(a)
Finding of previous administrative liability where a penalty is imposed, regardless of nature and/or gravity;
(b)
Length of service facilitated the commission of the offense;
(c)
Employment of fraudulent means to conceal the offense; and
(d)
Other analogous circumstances.
When one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances are present, the Court may impose a fine not exceeding double of the maximum prescribed under Rule 140. Hence, the JIB correctly increased the penalty to PHP 150,000.00 considering the finding of previous administrative liability against Judge Alzate in Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Corpus B. Alzate, A.M. No. RTJ-19-2574, June 23, 2021. In that case, Judge Alzate was fined in the amount of PHP 10,000.00 and admonished “not to socially mingle with cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors."[45] As well, Judge Alzate may be disciplined as a lawyer because Callena’s complaint specifically states that it is one for Judge Alzate’s “suspension/removal from [the] roll of attorneys” due to non-payment of IBP dues.[46] More, Callena pointed out that “stubborn refusal to pay [ ] membership dues to the [IBP]. . . is a ground for disbarment[.]"[47] On this score, the CPRA governs for it explicitly states that its provisions shall be applied to all pending and future cases, except to the extent that its retroactive application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which the cases were filed shall govern.[48] Canon III, Section 26 of the CPRA requires that a lawyer “promptly pay the annual membership dues in the IBP, unless expressly exempt from such payment by law or rules.” Relevantly, violation of IBP rules and issuances governing membership is a light offense punishable by any of the following: (a) fine within the range of PHP 1,000.00 to PHP 35,000.00; (b) censure; or (c) reprimand. Like Rule 140, as further amended by A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, the CPRA allows the appreciation of a previous finding of administrative liability as an aggravating circumstance.[49] Therefore, the JIB correctly recommended that Judge Alzate be fined in the amount of PHP 50,000.00. ACCORDINGLY, Judge Corpus B. Alzate is found GUILTY of the less serious charge of simple misconduct under Section 15(a), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Administrative Matter No. 21-08-09-SC and FINED in the amount of PHP 150,000.00 payable within three months from the promulgation of this Decision. If unpaid, such amount may be deducted from his salaries and benefits, including accrued leave credits. Judge Alzate is also found GUILTY of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability. He is FINED in the amount of PHP 50,000.00 payable within three months from the promulgation of this Decision. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Lastly, Judge Alzate is directed to update his IBP membership dues and report his compliance within 10 days from receipt of this Decision. SO ORDERED. Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Caguioa, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur. Hernando,* J., on official business. Gaerlan,** J., on official leave.r the application of the de facto officer doctrine: (1) there must be a de jure office; (2) there must be a color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and (3) there must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.[31] These elements were later reiterated and applied in the cases of Re: Nomination of Atty. Chaguile as Replacement for IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Gabawel[32] and Laud v. People.[33] The Court finds these three elements that warrant the application of the de facto officer doctrine present in this case. Applying these elements to the present case, it is clear that Judge Castañeda was exercising the duties of a de jure office. The position of Presiding Judge of Branch 67, RTC, Paniqui, Tarlac, is an established office, and there is no dispute regarding its legitimacy. Judge Castañeda, though suspended, continued to perform the duties of the office, issuing decisions and orders as if she were still entitled to do so. The second element—the existence of color of authority—is also satisfied. This means that the officer must have some semblance of authority or reputation for holding the office, which induces the public to rely on their actions as legitimate. In the case of Judge Castañeda, although she was under suspension, she continued to act as the Presiding Judge of Branch 67. There is no indication that the public, including the litigants who appeared before her, were aware of her suspension during this period. The fact that Judge Castañeda continued to perform the functions of a judge and issued decisions in over a thousand cases demonstrates that her actions were accepted by the public and parties appearing before her. This public acquiescence to her authority is crucial in establishing her status as a de facto officer. The final element—actual possession of the office and must perform the duties thereof in good faith—is likewise present. In this context, good faith means that the officer must have a genuine belief, albeit mistaken, that they are entitled to hold the office and exercise its functions. The Court’s pronouncement in Lumayna v. Commission on Audit,[34] as reiterated in Madera v. Commission on Audit,[35] is instructive:
Furthermore, granting arguendo that the municipality’s budget adopted the incorrect salary rates, this error or mistake was not in any way indicative of bad faith. Under prevailing jurisprudence, mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable, absent a clear showing that he was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. It does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. Rather, there must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent; or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud and contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Judge Castañeda did not act with malice or bad faith in continuing to perform her duties during her suspension. She appeared to be acting under the mistaken belief that she was entitled to resume her judicial functions after a certain period, pursuant to her understanding of Rule 2, Section 20 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which provides:
When the administrative case against an officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of 90 days after the date of preventive suspension, unless otherwise provided by special law, he shall be automatically reinstated in the service[.]
Judge Castañeda’s reliance on the said rule—providing for automatic reinstatement after a 90-day suspension if no final decision is rendered—supports the argument that she acted under color of authority and in good faith. While this provision does not override the Court’s power to suspend judges until the final resolution of administrative cases, it suggests that Judge Castañeda mistakenly believed she was lawfully entitled to return to her duties. This belief, combined with the lack of public awareness regarding her suspension, satisfies the good faith requirement essential for invoking the de facto officer doctrine. The presumption of good faith, unless rebutted by clear evidence to the contrary, weighs in her favor. Assuming arguendo that Judge Castañeda’s insistence on reinstating herself as Presiding Judge of Branch 67 despite her suspension was tainted by bad faith, it is still pertinent to note that the de facto officer doctrine generally hinges on whether the officer exercises the functions of a de jure office under a color of authority. Actual physical possession of the office in good faith is sparingly discussed but implied, as exemplified in Rodriguez, Sr. v. Tan.[37] In that case, although the defendant usurped the plaintiffs Senate seat, the Court allowed the defendant to retain his salary, since he had rendered public service during his tenure. The Court deemed the defendant a de facto officer, as he acted under color of authority until ousted by an election protest, suggesting an implicit good faith. Similarly, in Codilla v. Martinez,[38] the Court emphasized color of authority as the crucial standard, rather than good faith possession, in recognizing a de facto officer. This principle also appeared in Re: Nomination of Atty. Chaguile, where the officer’s good faith was inferred from her lack of involvement in any irregular scheme regarding her appointment.[39] In Laud, the Court applied the de facto officer doctrine based on presumed good faith, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Likewise, in Gamboa v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court presumed good faith, ruling that the judge’s official acts were valid despite the judge rendering decisions after submitting his resignation, yet before receiving notice of its acceptance. The Court held that the public, and third parties, are unaffected by the judge’s prior unofficial knowledge of his resignation’s acceptance, implying good faith possession of office.[41] It is evident that good faith possession is not always a determining factor in the Court’s application of the de facto officer doctrine. Often, good faith is presumed or used as a conclusory statement, particularly in cases concerning a de facto officer’s entitlement to the salaries of the de jure office. For instance, in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[42] the Court invalidated an executive order allowing cabinet members to hold multiple offices, but nevertheless recognized the officials as de facto officers entitled to emoluments for services rendered. The ruling underscored that where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who discharges the duties of the office in good faith is entitled to the corresponding emoluments, based on principles of equity.[43] However, in Monroy v. Court of Appeals,[44] the Court held that a de facto officer takes salaries at their own risk and must account for them to the de jure officer. The general rule favors the de jure officer recovering salaries from the de facto officer during the latter’s wrongful tenure. The de facto officer doctrine, though formulated to protect the public from invalidating official acts performed by someone discharging the duties of office, does not guarantee the retention of salaries by a de facto officer. In Arimao v. Taher,[45] the Court revisited the rulings in Monroy and Civil Liberties Union, maintaining that a de facto officer must account for salaries received during wrongful retention. Yet, where there is no de jure officer, the de facto officer may keep emoluments, as affirmed in Civil Liberties Union. These rulings reaffirm that while color of authority determines de facto status, good faith is not always conclusive in assessing the validity of the officer’s actions. The doctrine’s primary purpose is to protect the public from disruptions in governance caused by irregularities in an officer’s title. To limit the doctrine’s applicability solely to cases involving good faith possession would render this objective nugatory and diminish its broader protective function. While the de facto officer doctrine provides a legal basis for validating the acts of Judge Castañeda during her suspension, the Court also considers the broader implications of its ruling. Judicial decisions, by their nature, affect the rights and interests of litigants who rely on the authority of the judge rendering such decisions. If the acts of de facto judges were to be invalidated ‘due to defects in their title or authority, the legal system would plunge into disorder, with numerous cases potentially reopened, judgments set aside, and the integrity of the judicial process undermined. Thus, to retroactively invalidate over 1,200 decisions rendered by Judge Castañeda would not only cause significant harm to the parties involved, but would also undermine the stability and integrity of the judicial process. Furthermore, the Court has consistently upheld the principle that litigants should not be penalized for administrative errors or defects in the authority of judicial officers. The case of Judge Castañeda presents a compelling situation where the public and litigants relied on her decisions during a period when her authority was impaired. To reiterate, invalidating her actions retroactively would create a cascade of consequences, potentially reopening cases and undermining the stability of judgments rendered during this period. The de facto officer doctrine thus serves the broader goal of maintaining judicial order, protecting the rights of parties who have acted in good faith, and preserving the integrity of the judicial process. The Court, therefore, upholds the validity of Judge Castañeda’s acts during the suspension period.
The Orders and Decisions issued by Judge Castañeda from March 23, 2010 to June 3, 2011 are likewise deemed valid through analogous application of the operative fact doctrine
The operative fact doctrine is an equitable principle that mitigates the retroactive effects of a declaration of nullity. The doctrine applies when the nullification of an act would result in unfairness or injustice, particularly when individuals or the public have relied on the invalid act in good faith. In numerous cases, the Court has held that the doctrine of operative fact recognizes that while an invalid law or act cannot create legal obligations going forward, its effects prior to its invalidation may still be given legal recognition to avoid undue prejudice to parties who acted in good faith. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,[46] citing Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank,[47] the Court had extensively discussed the metes and bounds of the operative fact doctrine:
The general rule is that a void law or administrative act cannot be the source of legal rights or duties. Article 7 of the Civil Code enunciates this general rule, as well as its exception: “Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.” The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general rule, such that a judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to such declaration. In Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, the application of the doctrine of operative fact was discussed as follows:
The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: “When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution.” It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive. Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.” This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co.[48] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Clearly, the Court explained the rationale behind the operative fact doctrine, stating that “the past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.” The doctrine aims to prevent undue harshness and inequity that would arise if all actions taken under an invalid law were automatically nullified. As such, the doctrine acknowledges the practical reality that void acts, particularly those of public officials, may still produce legal effects that must be recognized to avoid injustice. For the operative fact doctrine to apply, two essential conditions must be present: (1) there must be a legislative or executive measure (such as a law or executive issuance) that is later declared invalid; and (2) there must have been reliance on the invalid measure in good faith by individuals or the public.[49] The question now arises: may the operative fact doctrine, which traditionally applies to legislative and executive acts, be extended to judicial acts performed by a judge who lacks lawful authority due to suspension? The answer lies in the purpose and underlying rationale of the doctrine itself, which is to prevent inequity and injustice to parties who rely on official acts in good faith, regardless of the source of the void act—whether legislative, executive, or judicial. While the doctrine traditionally applies to legislative or executive acts, its principles may be analogously applied to judicial acts performed under a color of authority that are later nullified. In the case of Judge Castañeda, her suspension rendered her judicial acts void, as she lacked the authority to adjudicate cases or issue decisions during the period of suspension. However, the litigants who appeared before her and the parties affected by her decisions had no knowledge of her suspension and relied on her judicial acts in good faith. These parties acted under the presumption that her authority was legitimate, and to invalidate her decisions retroactively would cause undue harm to their rights and interests. While our jurisprudence has yet to definitively apply the operative fact doctrine to judicial acts, the principles of equity and fairness underlying the doctrine are equally applicable in this context. Just as individuals who rely on a void executive or legislative act should not be unduly penalized, so too should litigants who relied on a judge’s decisions in good faith not suffer the consequences of a suspension they had no knowledge of. The doctrine of operative fact provides a legal mechanism for recognizing the validity of the judicial decisions rendered by Judge Castañeda during her suspension, insofar as they affected the rights of third parties who relied on them in good faith. Thus, this legal and equitable doctrine that was developed in relation to void executive and legislative acts should, by analogy, extend to judicial acts, ensuring that justice is served for all parties involved. The de facto officer doctrine and the operative fact doctrine share common principles, particularly in preserving legal stability and protecting the rights of individuals who rely on official acts performed under color of authority. While the de facto officer doctrine validates the acts of a public officer who appears to hold office legitimately, the operative fact doctrine validates the effects of void acts performed under such authority. In the present case, the de facto officer doctrine may validate the acts of Judge Castañeda during her suspension by treating her as a de facto judge who continued to exercise her judicial functions under color of authority. The operative fact doctrine complements this by recognizing the legal effects of her decisions, particularly where third parties have relied on them in good faith. Together, these doctrines balance the need for judicial accountability with the protection of litigants’ rights and the preservation of legal certainty. Several judicial precedents have consistently recognized the role of the operative fact doctrine in situations where invalid acts have given rise to consequences that cannot be easily unwound without inflicting injustice. In Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation,[50] the Court applied the operative fact doctrine to shield individuals who had acted in compliance with Republic Act No. 9167, a law later declared unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the parties involved, having acted in good faith, should not be compelled to return the funds they had lawfully received under the now-invalidated statute.[51] The Court emphasized that the doctrine operates to preserve the effects of acts that have become part of the legal landscape, particularly where the parties have reasonably relied on them. Similarly, in League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC,[52] the Court applied the operative fact doctrine and upheld the legal effects of the cityhood laws prior to their nullification, recognizing the validity of actions performed by the newly created cities under these laws, such as the payment of salaries and the issuance of contracts.[53] This case reaffirmed the principle that once void acts have engendered legal relations and expectations, it may be inequitable to unravel these acts, especially where third parties relied on them in good faith. These cases illustrate that the operative fact doctrine is a well-established principle of equity that serves to protect individuals and the public from the harsh consequences of retroactive nullification. While these cases involve legislative acts, the principles articulated by the Court are equally applicable to judicial acts, particularly where the invalidity of the judge’s authority was unknown to the litigants who relied on his or her decisions in good faith. Thus, the case of Judge Castañeda presents a compelling scenario for the analogous application of the operative fact doctrine to judicial acts. While her suspension rendered her judicial acts void, the effects of those acts should not be automatically nullified, particularly where third parties relied on them in good faith. The operative fact doctrine, as an exception to the general rule that void acts are a nullity, provides a legal framework for recognizing the validity of Judge Castañeda’s decisions during her suspension, insofar as they affected the rights of litigants who were unaware of her lack of authority. In view of the equitable and fair principles that undergird both the de facto officer and operative fact doctrines, the Court finds it proper to uphold the validity of the decisions and orders issued by Judge Castañeda during her period of suspension. The litigants who appeared before her acted in good faith, unaware of her incapacity, and relied on the apparent judicial authority she continued to exercise. To nullify her judicial acts retroactively would not only disrupt the orderly administration of justice, but also inflict considerable injustice upon the parties who, through no fault of their own, trusted in the legitimacy of her actions. ACCORDINGLY, the Orders and Decisions rendered by Judge Liberty O. Castañeda, formerly the Presiding Judge of Branch 67, Regional Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac, acting as a de facto officer during her suspension from January 12, 2010 to October 9, 2012, are declared VALID. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parties concerned, and the same shall be duly entered into the records of the covered cases. SO ORDERED. Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur. Hernando,** J., on official business. Gaerlan,*** J., on official leave. Marquez,**** J., no part.