G.R. No. 249681

ESTATE OF MURRAY PHILIP WILLIAMS, AS REPRESENTED BY DENIS MICHAEL STANLEY, PETITIONER, VS. WILLIAM VICTOR PERCY, RESPONDENT.

[ G.R. No. 249681. August 31, 2022 ] 929 Phil. 349

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 249681. August 31, 2022 ]

ESTATE OF MURRAY PHILIP WILLIAMS, AS REPRESENTED BY DENIS MICHAEL STANLEY, PETITIONER, VS. WILLIAM VICTOR PERCY, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

GAERLAN, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the Resolutions dated April 24, 2019[2] and September 26, 2019[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 159020. The assailed issuances dismissed outright petitioner Denis Michael Stanley’s (Stanley’s) petition for certiorari, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent William Victor Percy (Percy).

Antecedents

Following the death of Murray Philip Williams (Williams), Letters of Administration[4] were issued by Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City in favor of Stanley on July 22, 2014 in Special Proceeding Case No. 65-0-12.[5] On August 12, 2015, Stanley filed, on behalf of the Estate of Williams, a Complaint-Affidavit[6] for carnapping and estafa against Percy before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Olongapo City, Zambales. Stanley alleged that prior to his death, Williams entrusted two of his cars to Percy for safekeeping, specifically: a red 2007 Mercedes Benz ML500 with Plate No. ZGE-201[7] and a white platinum metallic 2011 Ford Expedition 4x4 AT Eddie Bauer EL with Engine No. AEB52740 and Chassis No. 1FMJK1J5XAEB52740.[8] When Stanley demanded[9] the return of the said vehicles, Percy failed to do so.[10] As a result, Stanley was constrained to file a criminal complaint against him. In his Counter-Affidavit,[11] Percy denied that the two vehicles were entrusted to him by Williams. He asserted that the same were the subject of a transaction between Williams and one William James Wardle, the details of which he was not privy to.[12] On June 30, 2016, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Olongapo City issued a Resolution[13] finding probable cause to file a criminal case for two counts of carnapping against Percy. Thus, Percy was indicted by virtue of two Informations dated August 22, 2016, the accusatory portions of which state:

Criminal Case No. 2016-1504

That on or about the month of January 2011, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, complainant Estate of Murray Philip Williams, represented by its duly appointed administrator, Denis Michael Estanley [sic], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away a Red 2007 Mercedez [sic] Benz ML500 with plate number ZGE201, engine number 112964300744324 and chassis number 4JGBB75E87A180151, which belonged to the deceased [Murray] Philip Williams. CONTRARY TO LAW.[14]

Criminal Case No. 2016-1505

That on or about the month of January 2011, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, complainant Estate of Murray Philip Williams, represented by its duly appointed administrator, Denis Michael Estanley [sic], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away a White Platinum Metallic 2011 Ford Expedition EL engine number AEB52740 and chassis number 1FMJKIJ5XAE52740, which belonged to the deceased [Murray] Philip Williams. CONTRARY TO LAW.[15]

The cases were consolidated and raffled to Branch 72 of the RTC of Olongapo City. During the trial, the prosecution was able to present its documentary and testimonial evidence. Afterwards, it made a Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence.[16] Thereafter, Percy filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence,[17] followed by the corresponding Demurrer to Evidence.[18] He prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the evidence adduced by the prosecution were all insufficient to prove the presence of the elements of the crime of carnapping.[19] On October 16, 2018, the RTC issued an Order[20] granting the demurrer to evidence, reasoning that the prosecution failed to adduce the quantum of evidence required to convict Percy of two counts of carnapping. Thus:

IN VIEW THEREOF, the demurrer to evidence filed by accused William Victor Percy is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, these cases are hereby ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.[21]

Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration,[22] and admittedly without securing the conformity of the People through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),[23] Stanley filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari[24] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He asserted, as a sole ground, that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting Percy’s demurrer to evidence “DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND DESPITE ALL AVAILABLE JURISPRUDENTIAL PRECEDENTS."[25] On April 14, 2019, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution[26] dismissing the petition for failure on the part of Stanley to serve the same to Percy’s current and complete address. The pertinent portions of the said issuance reads:

On 05 March 2019, the Court required the petitioner to inform the current and complete address of private respondent within five (5) days from notice, otherwise, the Petition may be dismissed for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the latter, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Instead of complying with the Court’ s directive, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion insisting that service of the Petition upon private respondent’s counsel should be deemed sufficient, inasmuch as the pleadings filed by said private respondent before the court a quo all bear his counsel’s address. In the alternative, petitioner seeks for a thirty (30)-day period within which to submit the required complete and current address of the private respondent. We find petitioner’s explanation unsatisfactory. Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules requires that the petition be filed together with proof of service thereof on the respondent. Corollary thereto, Section 4, Rule 46 of the same Rules states that jurisdiction over the person of the respondent shall be acquired by service on him of the Court’s order or resolution indicating Our initial action on the petition or by voluntary submission to such jurisdiction. It [is] evident that both proof of service of the Petition to the private respondent AND service on him of the Court’s order or resolution on its initial action are required for the Petition to prosper. However, petitioner only furnished private respondent’s counsel a copy of the Petition, without serving a copy on the respondent himself. The service of the Petition upon the person of the respondent, and not upon his counsel, is what the Rules properly require, and not the other way around. x x x x It may be true that petitioner alternatively prays for an extension of thirty (30) days within which to comply with the Court’s directive. However, petitioner failed to offer any reason why the Court should grant the same. Even the oft-repeated phrase, “in the interest of justice,” was not invoked. Hence, We find no reason why leniency on the application of the Rules should be accorded in absence of any justifiable or meritorious explanation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Manifestation With Omnibus Motion is hereby DENIED and the instant Petition is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the case [is] deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED. SO ORDERED.[27]

Stanley filed a Motion for Reconsideration[28] arguing that contrary to the CA’ s conclusion, the appellate court had in fact acquired jurisdiction over the person of Percy. Stanley points to Percy’s Comment to Petition[29] dated March 18, 2019 which was filed before the CA. In the said comment, Percy prayed for the outright dismissal of the petition on the ground that only the People, through the OSG, may question an acquittal in a criminal case. The CA denied Stanley’s motion in the second assailed Resolution[30] dated September 26, 2019. Hence, the present recourse.

Arguments

Stanley beseeches the Court to order the CA to give due course to his petition for certiorari. He contends that by interposing a comment to the said petition without expressing any objections, Percy voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the appellate court; and that the case should be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.[31] On the other hand, Percy, in his Comment to Petition,[32] contended that the instant petition be dismissed because it seeks to appeal an acquittal which only the OSG has the authority to do. In his Reply,[33] Stanley asseverated that the Estate of Williams is not precluded from questioning the civil aspect of the case on its own. He contended that because the Estate of Williams never made any reservation on separately pursuing the civil aspect of the case, it maintains an interest on the dismissal of the criminal aspect thereof.[34]

Issue

The Court is tasked to determine whether the CA erred in dismissing outright the petition filed by Stanley in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Williams.

Ruling of the Court

I.

Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case.[35] Being a matter of substantive law,[36] it pertains to the right of the court to act in a case.[37] In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.[38] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.[39] Conferred by the Constitution[40] or given by law and in the manner prescribed by law,[41] jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint, including the character of the reliefs prayed for.[42] On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person or the parties, or jurisdiction in personam, refers to the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action.[43] It is the power of the court to make decisions that are binding on persons.[44] It is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem.[45] The instant case involves the determination of whether the CA validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Percy. In original cases filed before the CA, such as the subject petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court that Stanley filed a quo, the appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the person of a respondent by serving upon him or her an order or resolution indicating its initial action on the said petition. Rule 46, Section 4 so states:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how acquired. — The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.

In order for the CA to be able to effect the said order or resolution upon the person of a respondent to a petition, it is incumbent upon a petitioner to inform the CA of said respondent’s complete address. This is accomplished by furnishing the CA with a proof of service of the petition on the respondent concerned, as provided by Rule 4, Section 3.[46] Nevertheless, it bears stressing that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant or respondent, as the case may be, is also acquired through his or her voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.[47] There is voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court’s lack of jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court.[48] In the instant case, Percy voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the CA when he filed a Comment to Petition dated March 18, 2019 praying for the outright dismissal of Stanley’s petition for certiorari on the sole ground that it was not filed with the authority or conformity of the OSG.[49] His voluntary appearance is equivalent to service.[50] Prescinding from the foregoing, one may readily conclude that the CA was too hasty in dismissing Stanley’s petition for certiorari and, as a result, it is incumbent upon this Court to remand the case to the CA and direct the appellate court to give due course thereto. However, because this Court has the solemn duty to protect the Constitution and the constitutional rights of individuals,[51] particularly Percy’s, We cannot do so.

II.

Even if the Court were to remand the instant case to the CA, the eventual outcome will be the same. It will be dismissed because (1) it was filed without the conformity or authority of the OSG; and (2) it violates Percy’s right against double jeopardy.

II. A.

In the appeal of criminal cases before the CA or the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General.[52] That is, only the OSG may bring or defend actions in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the CA.[53] Stanley acknowledges this much in his Reply.[54] Nevertheless, in a bid to circumvent the foregoing rule, Stanley backpedaled and asserted that he was actually seeking to protect the rights of the Estate of Williams insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned. We reject Stanley’s lame excuse. A reading of Stanley’s Petition for Certiorari[55] with the CA readily shows that not a single sentence in the said pleading discusses the civil aspect of the criminal cases filed against Percy. The entirety of said petition uniformly contends that the trial court erred in its evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution when it granted Percy’s demurrer to evidence. Every single paragraph limited itself to the discussion of the elements of the crime of carnapping and why the trial court erred in acquitting Percy. At the risk of being repetitious, it is worth noting, at this juncture, that the assignment of error in Stanley’s petition for certiorari before the CA made one solitary contention, that: “THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE ACCUSED’S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND DESPITE ALL AVAILABLE JURISPRUDENTIAL PRECEDENTS."[56] It is crystal clear that Stanley was seeking to appeal an acquittal in a criminal case despite knowing all along that he had neither the right nor the authority to do so. In any event, granting arguendo that Stanley was truthfully questioning the civil aspect of the suject criminal cases, the fact remains that he instituted his petition for certiorari before the CA without first filing a motion for reconsideration with the RTC. The rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.[57] Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.[58] While this rule admits of exceptions,[59] none of which is obtaining in this case. Stanley cannot arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not.[60]

II. B.

Settled is the principle that an order granting a demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the merits[61] and is tantamount to an acquittal.[62] We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine which edifies the principle that a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.[63] Any attempt to overturn an acquittal runs afoul of an accused’s right against double jeopardy as provided in Section 21,[64] Article III of the Constitution.

In People v. Sandiganbayan,[65] We explained:

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is “filed after the prosecution had rested its case,” and when the same is granted, it calls “for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.” Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.[66] (Citations omitted)

Case law provides only one exception to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, i.e., when the trial court has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham, thus, rendering the assailed judgment void.[67] Here, records show that the prosecution completed the presentation of all its documentary and testimonial evidence during the trial without a hitch. It was also able to make a formal offer of evidence. The trial was not a sham. The aforementioned exception, therefore, does not apply in this case. Directing the CA to give due course to Stanley’s petition for certiorari would be tantamount to placing Percy twice in jeopardy for criminal offenses that he had already been acquitted from. All told, We find that the CA erred in concluding that it was not able to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Percy. Nonetheless, because it is the mandate of the Court to put primacy on constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty,[68] this Court cannot remand the case to the CA for further proceedings because Stanley had no authority to file the said petition in the first place; and, more importantly, because doing so would violate Percy’s right against double jeopardy. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED. Hernando,* Dimaampao and Singh, JJ., concur. Caguioa, J. (Chairperson), see concurring opinion.