[ G.R. No. 193584. July 12, 2016 ] 789 Phil. 651
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 193584. July 12, 2016 ]
HAMBRE J. MOHAMMAD, PETITIONER, VS. GRACE BELGADO-SAQUETON, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR IV, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. XVI, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review filed by Hambre J. Mohammad (petitioner) assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated 27 January 2010 and Resolution[2] dated 16 August 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02392-MIN. The CA reversed the Orders[3] dated 26 July 2006 and 7 August 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court Branch 14 in Cotabato City (RTC) in Special Civil Action No. 2006-096. The issue before this Court is whether the filing of a petition for mandamus with the RTC was proper despite the availability of an administrative remedy against the unfavorable Decision of Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. XVI (CSCRO No. XVI). We affirm the CA Decision. The failure of petitioner to exhaust available administrative remedies was fatal to his cause.
The Facts of the Case
On 8 September 2004, petitioner was appointed as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer II (PARO II) of the Department of Agrarian Reform in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DAR-ARMM) with Salary Grade 26.[4] His appointment was temporary as he had no Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) or eligibility in the Career Executive Service (CES).[5] On 8 September 2005, his temporary appointment was renewed.[6] On 24 October 2005, petitioner requested the regional secretary of DAR-ARMM to change his appointment status from temporary to permanent. His request was pursuant to an RTC decision in Special Civil Action No. 2005-085[7] concerning the change in status of division superintendents.[8] He opined that his position was the same as that of petitioners therein, whose petition for mandamus had been granted by the trial court.[9] His request was endorsed[10] to the regional governor, who then submitted the matter for favorable consideration of CSCRO No. XVI.[11] Respondent Grace Belgado-Saqueton (respondent), Director IV of CSCRO No. XVI, denied the request on the ground of the inapplicability of the RTC Decision, which was binding only on the parties to that case.[12] Moreover, she informed petitioner that the trial court’s decision had been submitted by the CSC to the courts for review.[13] Petitioner did not elevate the case to the Civil Service Commission proper. Instead, he filed a special civil action for mandamus before the RTC. He invoked an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: when the question is purely legal. He argued that because the PARO II position did not require CES eligibility and was not declared to be a CES position, respondent can be compelled through mandamus to change his status from temporary to permanent.[14] Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On 22 June 2006, during the pendency of the case, the Office of the Regional Governor appointed petitioner to the same position with a permanent status.[15]
The RTC Ruling
On 26 July 2006, the RTC ordered respondent to approve and attest to the appointment status of petitioner as permanent.[16] It ruled that he was able to establish that respondent had unlawfully neglected or refused to approve his appointment even if the law, the facts, and the evidence mandated her to approve the request.[17] As regards the Motion to Dismiss, the RTC maintained that it had jurisdiction over the case which presented a pure question of law. The court further held that had petitioner taken the route of appealing to the CSC proper, it would have been an exercise in futility, since issues of law cannot be decided with finality by the commission.[18] Respondent moved for reconsideration, calling the attention of the court to CSC Resolution No. 02-1011,[19] which states:
- Permanent appointment issued after the effectivity of [this Resolution] to appointees who do not possess the required CSEE or CES eligibility shall be disapproved. This is without prejudice to their appointments under temporary status provided there are no qualified eligibles who are willing to assume the position.[20]
Respondent also argued that the approval or disapproval of an appointment is not a ministerial but a discretionary duty; hence, mandamus does not lie.[21] On 7 August 2006, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration for being a mere rehash of arguments already raised.[22] After respondent filed a Notice of Appeal on 15 August 2006, the trial court, on 30 August 2006, granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal.[23]
The CA Ruling
On intermediate appellate review, the CA reversed the RTC Orders dated 26 July 2006 and 7 August 2006. It agreed with respondent that petitioner had prematurely brought the case to the RTC without exhausting all the remedies available to him.[24] The CA traced the jurisdiction of the CSC proper over decisions of CSCROs to Sections 4[25] and 5[26] of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. These rules were promulgated pursuant to the Constitution[27] and the CSC Law.[28] Also cited were other administrative issuances categorically providing remedies for disapproved appointments, such as CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998;[29] and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, series of 2002.[30] The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner for being a mere rehash of arguments already passed upon. He then elevated the case to this Court for review.
Our Ruling
We deny the Petition. Before parties are allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that they must have availed themselves of all the means of administrative processes afforded to them.[31] Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts - for reasons of law, comity, and convenience - will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.[32] Petitioner admits that while administrative remedies were available to him, he had invoked an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.[33] On the contrary, We find that the dismissal of the petition for mandamus was warranted by the doctrine because the issue raised by petitioner is not a purely legal question. The Court has laid down tests to distinguish questions of fact from questions of law: when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, or when it becomes clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question is one of fact.[34] It was grave error for the trial court to have ignored the red flags raised by both parties. Respondent has repeatedly asserted that the PARO II position is a third-level position requiring CES or CSEE.[35] Petitioner himself raised an issue of fact when he posited that there was no position in the ARMM that had been declared to be a CES position.[36] To disprove this allegation, respondent presented the Qualification Standards prescribed for the position which shows that it is a third-level position requiring CES or CSEE.[37] Since doubt has risen as to the truth or falsity of the alleged fact, it cannot be said that the case presents a purely legal question. We are aware of our pronouncement in Buena, Jr. v. Benito[38] that the issue of whether the position for which the respondent therein was appointed required career service eligibility was a purely legal question. In that case, We held that the direct recourse to the courts from the Decision of the CSCRO fell under an exception to the doctrine. Nevertheless, We set aside the RTC order, because we found that the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent is a position in the CES. There are at least three material differences between this case and Buena. First, in Buena, the question was whether the position is in the CES. In this case, the question is whether petitioner was eligible for a permanent appointment to the PARO II position, which had already been classified as a third-level position requiring CSEE or CES.[39] The issue is therefore not one of law, but of the merit and fitness of the appointee, which is a question of fact. Second, in Buena, no evidence was presented to the trial court that could have created doubt as to the truth or falsity of the allegation. In this case, the qualification standards for the position were presented, but were unacknowledged as a matter of fact by the trial court. Third, in Buena, the petition for mandamus was filed after the appointment had been issued by the regional governor. The element of a clear legal right was met in Buena because Section 19, Art. VII of Republic Act No. 9054 (Organic Act for the ARMM) designated the regional governor as the appointing authority in the ARMM. In this case, petitioner had no clear legal right to compel respondent to attest to his appointment, because at the time of filing, he had no appointment to a permanent position. Hence, the Petition should have been dismissed outright. We have recognized the CSC as the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.[40] The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is “a cornerstone of our judicial system,"[41] impels Us to allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competencies.[42] We refrain from the overarching use of judicial power in matters of policy infused with administrative character.[43] Hence, the doctrine has been set aside only for exceptional circumstances. Petitioner pleads for a liberal construction of the rules owing to the nature of the case as one of first impression involving a position in the ARMM vis-a-vis the application of CSC rules.[44] His plea has been mooted, however, by the promulgation of Buena, in which We highlighted Section 4, Art. XVI of the Organic Act for the ARMM which states that “until the Regional Assembly shall have enacted a civil service law, the civil service eligibilities required by the central government or national government for appointments to public positions shall likewise be required for appointments to government positions in the Regional Government.” WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 27 January 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02392-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur. Mendoza, J., on sabbatical leave. Reyes, J., on wellness leave.