[ G.R. No. 185312. December 01, 2016 ] 801 Phil. 589
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 185312. December 01, 2016 ]
NICANOR MALABANAN, AURORA MANAIG, RONNIE MALABANAN, VICTOR MALABANAN, SEVERINO MALABANAN, EUFROCINIA MALABANAN, EUFROCILA MALABANAN, REYNALDO MALABANAN, AND DONATA MALABANAN, PETITIONERS, V. HEIRS OF ALFREDO RESTRIVERA, REPRESENTED BY BIENVENIDO RESTRIVERA AND REMEDIOS RESTRIVERA-ESPERIDION, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 97787, which affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Resolution dated 10 October 2006.[2] The latter reinstated the Decision[3]] issued by the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (RARAD), Region IV, in the Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs), Declaration of Nullity of Sale, Repossession and Reconveyance filed by respondents against petitioners.
RARAD directed the Cavite Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), as well as the Register of Deeds (RD), to recall the CLOAs and the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) issued to petitioners over a sequestered agricultural land previously owned by respondents’ father. In lieu thereof, RARAD ordered the issuance of new certificates in favor of respondents. Petitioners argue, however, that it had no jurisdiction over the petition.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The disputed property is an 8.839-hectare agricultural land situated in Potrero, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. It used to be registered under the name of Alfredo Restrivera, as shown by his Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-13.[4] In 1968, OCT No. 0-13 was cancelled by TCT No. T-28631 under the name of Independent Realty Corporation (IRC). After the ouster of the Marcos administration, the IRC voluntarily surrendered the land to the Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG).[5]
The PCGG then transferred the above property to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for distribution to qualified farmer-beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) by virtue of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on Sequestered Agricultural Lands between the PCGG and the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR),[6] as well as Executive Order (E.O.) No. 407, Series of 1990.[7]
In February 2002, DAR awarded the land to petitioners. Two collective CLOAs[8] were generated and the RD eventually issued to them derivative TCT Nos. CLOA-2838[9] and CLOA-2839.[10]
Invoking their preferential right as farmer-beneficiaries under Section 22 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6657,[11] respondents filed before the Adjudication Board for Region IV a Petition for Cancellation of CLOA, Declaration of Nullity of Sale, Repossession and Reconveyance[12] against petitioners, Charmaine Uy, the PARO of Cavite, and the RD of Cavite in February 2003.
Respondents alleged that (1) Alfredo never transferred his title to the subject land to any entity; (2) petitioners were perpetually disqualified from benefitting from CARP because they had sold the subject land to Charmaine Uy in violation of Section 73(f) of R.A. 6657 and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1996;[13] (3) prior to the award, petitioners also executed a waiver of their rights to the subject land in favor of other potential farmer-beneficiaries; and (4) the land had a slope of 18% as shown in the DAR regional director’s Investigation Report[14] and was, therefore, exempt from CARP coverage.
The Malabanans, the DAR-Legal Assistance Division, and Charmaine Uy filed separate Answers[15] raising these substantially similar defenses: (1) no waiver of rights or sale of the subject land had ever occurred; (2) respondents had no legal standing to file the petition, because Restrivera was not the registered owner of the property; and (3) the petition was premature because whether or not the land was exempt from CARP was an Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI)[16] issue that needed to be resolved first by the DAR Secretary.
RULING OF RARAD
RARAD disposed of the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby issued:
Declaring that the generation and the subsequent issuance of CLOA Nos. 00596619 and 00596620 registered under TCT No. CLOA 2838 and TCT 2839, respectively, covering the subject parcel of land were in violation of petitioners’ preferential rights as farmer-beneficiaries under Section 22 of RA 6657 and under the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DAR and the PCGG dated February 23, 1987;
Declaring further that the afore-cited CLOAs were issued over a property which is excluded/exempted under Section 10 RA 6657 for having more than 18 degrees slope;
Declaring finally that the preceding paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof warrant the cancellation of CLOA and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title derived therefrom registered in the name of private respondents;
Directing the public respondents to recall the afore-cited CLOAs and generate new ones in the name of the petitioners and submit the same to the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite;
Directing the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite to cause the cancellation of CLOAs and the derivative Transfer Certificate of Title above-cited and upon receipt of the newly generated CLOA as directed in paragraph 4 hereof to cause the registration of the same in place of the cancelled TCT/CLOA.[17]
RARAD gave credence to the petitioners’ denial of the supposed waiver of their rights and the sale of the subject land. Still, it sustained the claim of respondents as preferred beneficiaries and ruled that they had legal standing to assail the award of the land, since they were Alfredo’s compulsory heirs.
Moreover, RARAD dismissed petitioners’ theory that there were pending ALI issues that needed to be resolved by the DAR Secretary. Instead, it ruled that the regional director’s Investigation Report was a conclusive finding that the land was exempt from CARP coverage; and that the issue of whether or not there was a violation of respondents’ preferential right was judicial in nature.
Consequently, DAR’s legal counsel[18] filed a Motion for Reconsideration[19] on behalf of the Malabanans, PARO, and the RD. Subsequently, he filed a Withdrawal of Appearance for Private Respondents-Farmer Beneficiaries.[20] The Malabanans, without the assistance of counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal within the reglementary 15-day period.[21]
Because of the pending Motion for Reconsideration, RARAD deferred its action on the Notice of Appeal.[22] In the end, it denied the motion for lack of a new matter or substantial argument supporting a reversal of its Decision.[23]
RULINGS OF DARAB
Upon Notice of Appeal[24] filed by DAR’s legal counsel, DARAB directed all parties to submit their respective memorandums.[25]
In due course, DARAB rendered a Decision dated 28 April 2006,[26] with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Board resolves to SET ASIDE the assailed decision dated August 27, 2003 and immediately refer this case to the Honorable Office of the DAR Secretary for its determination on prejudicial issues concerning Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI).[27]
According to DARAB, the issues of whether the subject land was exempt from CARP coverage and whether the respondents were the preferred beneficiaries were ALI issues that had yet to be resolved by the DAR Secretary. It observed that the Investigation Report cited by respondents was not the outcome of an application for exemption or exclusion under the “Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.” In this light, there was no basis for RARAD’s cancellation of the CLOAs and the derivative TCTs on the ground that the awarded land was exempt from land distribution.
DARAB held that the adjudicator should have referred the petition to the DAR Secretary for the determination of those pending prejudicial ALI issues.
Moreover, DARAB dismissed respondents’ argument that the appeal was dismissible because both the Malabanans and DAR failed to perfect their appeals. Instead, DARAB allowed the appeal in order to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration[28] by respondents, however, DARAB issued a Resolution dated 10 October 2006 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Board dated April 28, 2006 is SET ASIDE. A NEW DECISION is hereby rendered:
RECALLING and REINSTATING the Decision dated August 27, 2003 rendered by the Honorable Adjudicator a quo; and
DECLARING the Decision dated August 27, 2003 and the Resolution dated November 18, 2003 rendered by the Honorable Adjudicator a quo final in view of the defective notices of appeal filed by both public and private respondents-appellants.[29]
DARAB noted that the petition filed by respondents stemmed from their letter[30] to the DAR Secretary requesting an inspection of the subject land. In turn, the Secretary issued a Memorandum[31] indorsing their letter to the regional director and directing him to submit a comprehensive report on result of the latter’s inspection. DARAB then ruled that the director’s report was a determinative finding that the land was exempt from CARP, and that there were no pending ALI questions that needed to be resolved by the DAR Secretary.
It was further held that petitioners were indeed disqualified from benefitting from the agrarian reform program. Their waiver of their rights as farmer-beneficiaries supposedly showed that they did not possess the requisite willingness, aptitude or ability to cultivate the subject land. Therefore, the cancellation of their CLOAs and derivative TCTs was only proper.
DARAB reversed, as well, its earlier pronouncement that there was a compelling reason to relax procedural rules in this case. It ruled that the RARAD Decision had already lapsed into finality because of the failure of both the Malabanans and DAR to perfect their appeals.
RULING OF THE CA
After the DARAB’s denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,[32] petitioners filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 before the CA.[33]
The appellate court, however, found petitioners’ appeal unmeritorious. While conceding that the legality of the transfer of the subject land to the IRC had yet to be determined before the proper forum, the CA nonetheless ruled that respondents were entitled to the property, because it was registered under their father’s name prior to its transfer to the IRC. For this reason, they had legal personality to assail its award to petitioners.
The CA ruled further that the transfer by petitioners of their rights to the land was an additional ground for the cancellation of their titles. Consequently, the DARAB properly affirmed the RARAD Decision.
Lastly, the CA emphasized that only the last order or resolution completely disposing of the case can be the subject of an appeal. It noted that the subject of petitioners’ appeal was only the RARAD Decision; they did not file a new notice of appeal from the Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration. The appellate court therefore ruled that the RARAD Decision had long become final because of the failure of petitioners to perfect their appeal.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Resolution dated October 10, 2006 as well as the Resolution dated January 10, 2007 respectively of DARAB are hereby AFFIRMED.[34]
On 11 November 2008, the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.[35] Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES
The essential issues to be resolved are as follows: (1) whether petitioners have the legal personality to assail the distribution of the subject land under the agrarian reform program; and (2) whether the agrarian adjudicator has jurisdiction over a petition for cancellation of title and reconveyance of agricultural land sequestered by or surrendered to the PCGG.
COURT RULING
We GRANT the petition.
Before delving into the substantive issues, we first address the procedural issue of whether the RARAD Decision has become final because of the failure of petitioners to perfect their appeal.
True, petitioners did not file a new notice of appeal after RARAD had disposed of DAR’s Motion for Reconsideration. Contrary to respondents’ claim, however, RARAD did not dismiss the petitioners’ notice of appeal for being premature. Its Order[36] states:
This treats of private respondents’ Notice of Appeal from the Decision dated August 27, 2003 which was duly countered by petitioners with an Opposition on the ground that there is a pending motion for reconsideration, hence, the notice of appeal is premature.
Finding that the notice of appeal is too early to be acted upon, the same is held in abeyance until the motion for reconsideration shall have been disposed of.[37]
Additionally, while the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on behalf of both the Malabanans and DAR, their common legal counsel subsequently withdrew his appearance for the Malabanans. His withdrawal was in light of the letter[38] of the Malabanans informing him that they were intending to pursue their appeal separately from DAR. Notably, too, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal after the Withdrawal of Appearance by their former legal counsel.
Suffice it to say that petitioners filed a timely Notice of Appeal. It did not lose validity merely because RARAD deferred action on it during the pendency of DAR’s Motion for Reconsideration.[39] Indeed, DARAB eventually accepted petitioners’ appeal. The findings of both DARAB and the CA that petitioners failed to perfect their appeal are, therefore, wrong.
We now resolve the substantive issues.
Respondents have no legal standing to assail the award of the subject land to petitioners.
Fortich v. Corona[40] ordains that farmer-beneficiaries who are not approved awardees of CARP have no legal standing to question the exclusion of an agricultural land from CARP coverage. This pronouncement is anchored on the rule that any person seeking legal relief must have a real or present substantial interest, as opposed to mere expectancy; or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest in the matter under litigation.[41]
Simply put, the policy under the Constitution is that courts can only resolve actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable; judicial power cannot be invoked to settle mere academic issues or to render advisory opinions.[42]
In Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Hektarya v. Mosquera,[43] a farmer’s association challenged the exemption from land distribution of a 53-hectare property. On the issue of whether the individual members of the Samahan were real parties in interest, we ruled that those farmer-members could not be deemed to possess the legal personality to question the property’s exclusion from CARP, unless two requirements are fulfilled: the actual approval by the DAR and the consequent grant of CLOAs and award of the disputed land to those members. The generation of CLOAs under their names was of no consequence; at best, they had a mere expectancy, which was inadequate to vest them with the requisite interest in the subject matter of the litigation.
In this case, respondents trace their alleged ownership of the disputed property to OCT No. 0-13. Their claim that the property was illegally acquired by the IRC is unsubstantiated. The CA correctly noted that the issue of whether the acquisition of the property by IRC was lawful or not was still undetermined by the proper tribunal. Without question, however, the last known owner of the land before it was surrendered to the PCGG was the IRC. In fact, the derivative titles under question cancelled the latter’s title under TCT No. 28631, instead of OCT NO. 0-13. All things considered, there is yet no sufficient basis to say that Alfredo Restrivera was the previous owner of the land prior to its award to petitioners.
Respondents cannot rely solely on their father’s title to assert ownership over the subject land. A title is merely evidence of ownership of the particular property described therein. Ownership is not the same as a certificate of title.[44]
On the other hand, we cannot just disregard the existence of TCT No. 28631, which is under the name of the IRC. A Torrens certificate is the best evidence of ownership of registered land and serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person in whose name it was issued.[45] In the absence of a definitive ruling that TCT No. 28631 was illegally procured, we can only take the titles presented in evidence at their face value. At this point, respondents cannot claim ownership of the land, or any interest therein that could have been the subject of succession. Concomitantly, they have no legal standing to challenge the propriety of its distribution under CARP by virtue of their interest as Alfredo’s compulsory heirs.
Neither can respondents claim to have any present substantive interest in the disputed property as preferred beneficiaries under paragraph 2 of the MOA between DAR and the PCGG on sequestered lands. The cited paragraph states:
[2.] The PCGG shall transfer to the Republic of the Philippines the titles to those agricultural lands defined in paragraph 1 above that have been voluntarily turned over or surrendered to the PCGG and whose titles can now be transferred to the Republic without the need of further adjudication by the Sandiganbayan. These lands are to be distributed by MAR to qualified applicants/beneficiaries in accordance with R.A. 3844 and other pertinent law, rules and regulations; provided that the preferential rights over these lands of laborers, farmers, wage earners and employees of Independent Realty Corporation and other registered owners of these lands at the time they were surrendered or turned over voluntarily to PCGG, who have been occupying and/or working on said lands shall he recognized and respected by all parties concerned.[46] (Emphases supplied)
The right recognized under the above paragraph is conditioned on possession of title and actual occupation of property. In respondents’ case, the most they have established is that the land used to be registered under Alfredo’s name.
On the other hand, Section 22 of R.A. 6657 reads:
SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. — The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants; (b) regular farm workers; (c) seasonal farmworkers; (d) other farmworkers; (e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands; (f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and (g) others directly working on the land.
Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified under Section 6 of this Act shall be given preference in the distribution of the land of their parents: and Provided, further, That actual tenant-tillers in the landholdings shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.
Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold, disposed of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to become beneficiaries under this Program.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude, and ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC.
If, due to the landowner’s retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees, or workers on the land, there is not enough land to accommodate any or some of them, they may be granted ownership of other lands available for distribution under this Act, at the option of the beneficiaries.
Farmers already in place and those not accommodated in the distribution of privately-owned lands will be given preferential rights in the distribution of lands from the public domain.( Emphases supplied)
The law, therefore, does not automatically vest preferential rights upon the children of landowners.[47] To avail themselves of this right, claimants must show that: (1) their parents owned the subject land; and (2) it has been determined in the proper proceeding that the claimants are qualified beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program. Proof of these circumstances, however, are utterly wanting in this case.
In sum, respondents failed to show any real or present substantial interest in the subject land. Indeed, procedural rules can be relaxed in the interest of justice, but the present case does not merit such leniency. The requirement that a party must have real interest in the case is not simply procedural; it is essential to the administration of justice.[48] For these reasons, we set aside the CA’s finding that respondents have the legal personality to assail the award of the subject land to petitioners.
DARAB has no jurisdiction over the petition filed by respondents.
It is settled that for DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be an agrarian dispute or tenancy relationship existing between the parties.[49] There must be harmony between this settled principle and the rules that apply to the petition for the cancellation of CLOAs filed by respondents. The applicable set of rules is the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, under which Section 1,[50] Rule II, grants DARAB and its adjudicators jurisdiction over cases involving the correction, partition, cancellation, secondary and subsequent issuances of CLOAs and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority.
It is not sufficient that the controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA already registered with the Land Registration Authority as in this case. For purposes of determining whether DARAB has jurisdiction, the central consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute.[51]
Section 3 (d) of R.A. 6657 defines agrarian dispute as follows:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. (Emphases supplied)
In this case, respondents have not alleged any tenurial relationship with petitioners. Rather, their petition is centered on their supposed preferential right as farmer-beneficiaries and the suitability of the land for CARP coverage. These are matters falling under the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of DAR, which is supposed to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.[52]
Section 2, Rule I of DAR Administrative Order No. 03, series of 2003,[53] defines, by enumeration, ALI cases over which the regional director has primary jurisdiction. These cases include, among others, those arising from or involving the classification and identification of landholdings for CARP coverage (including protests of and petitions for lifting that coverage); and the classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries.
The proceedings in ALI cases are commenced by the filing of an initiatory pleading or petition either before the DAR Regional Office (DARRO) or the DAR Municipal Office (DARMO), depending on whether or not there has been a notice of CARP coverage.[54] After notice to all parties concerned, investigation and ocular inspection shall be conducted. The investigating officer may require the submission of position papers prior to the issuance of a decision.[55]
The question of whether the TCTs issued to petitioners should be cancelled hinges on whether the landholding is exempt from CARP coverage, which remains undetermined up this point.[56] As DARAB correctly pointed out in its Decision dated 28 April 2006, the investigation conducted by the regional director does not measure up to the proceedings and outcome described above. Hence, RARAD should not have acted on the petition. Under Section 5,[57] Rule II of the procedural rules on ALI cases, the petition should have been referred to the office of the DAR Secretary for the determination of pending ALI issues; specifically, whether the subject land was exempt from CARP coverage, and whether respondents were qualified and preferred farmer-beneficiaries.
Relevant to this case, too, is DAR Administrative Order No. 09-97[58] as amended. This issuance sets the guidelines for the recovery of lands turned over to DAR pursuant to E.O. 407,[59] but those lands were later found to be outside the coverage of CARP. Under these guidelines, the petition for reconveyance should be filed with the provincial, regional or national offices of DAR.[60] Moreover, the Order of Reconveyance should be issued by the regional director,[61] which can only be appealed to the DAR Secretary.[62]
Based on the above, we find that the Decision of RARAD was rendered without authority and jurisdiction; hence, it is void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20 June 2008 and Resolution dated 11 November 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97787 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The DARAB Decision dated 28 April 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED. Moreover, the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform is directed to expedite the resolution of this case.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,[*] Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.